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A borrower in search of credit may encounter resistance from the
money market if all that he is prepared to offer is his own unsupported
promise to repay. Today, one alternative for such a borrower is to
tender a security interest in any or all of his property, present and
future. The Uniform Commercial Code in Article 9 makes such a
secured transaction easy to arrange,' but it does not necessarily make
it advisable. A borrower may well have misgivings both about the
notoriety and about the controls which a secured transaction is likely
to entail. The Code minimizes these drawbacks, but it cannot eliminate
them: a secured creditor must still perfect, in order to prevail over
competing third parties, 2 and perfection will ordinarily take the form
of a financing statement placed on a public record;3 a secured creditor
must still police, for maximum protection in the event of his debtor's
bankruptcy, and policing must, despite the comforting repeal of Bene-
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1. Article 9 covers secured transactions in all kinds of personal property, "including
goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts or contract
rights . Section 9-102(l)(a). The parties are free to structure their security agreement
in any way they deem advisable, Section 9-201, as long as they' comply with the minimal
formalities of Article 9's Statute of Frauds provision, Section 9-203.
2. Unperfected security interests are subordinated, by Section 9-301(l), to a variety of
innocent competitors including a lien creditor; since a trustee in bankruptcy has the status
of a lien creditor under Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (Supp. 11
1965-66), unperfected security interests automatically lose their lien status when it is most
crucial to maintain it.
3. Perfection by filing is required unless the secured party takes possession of the
secured collateral or is entitled to one of the special exemptions relating to temporary
perfection or certain classes of collateral catalogued in Section 9-302. Part 4 of Article 9,
especially Section 9-402, describes the Artides notice filing system. See Section 9-208.
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dict v. Ratner,4 encompass at least the proceeds from collateral and
perhaps even the acquisition of collateral. 6 No well advised secured
creditor will be likely to forego these protective maneuvers, and their
execution involves real costs to the borrower. Not only must he bear
the expenses of administration inherent in a secured transaction,7 but
he must also run the risk that the filing of a financing statement may
impede the flow of unsecured credit from independent suppliers and
servicers.8
Perhaps ironically, the Code's de-emphasis of formal requisites, its
reduction of legal impediments to secured transactions, serves to em-
phasize the irreducible economic costs of collateral security arrange.
ments which remain. And, as a matter of fact, in the same years that
the Code was struggling for enactment, the financial community was
already exploring more attenuated forms of security, such as negative
pledges and subordination agreements,0 as less cumbersome devices for
credit. These security devices, often accompanied by creditor participa-
tion in the debtor's business through a voice on the board of directors,
were designed to substitute a greater measure of residual control for
day-by-day supervision of the debtor's business. Presumably, such ar-
rangements fall outside the scope of Article 9,10 thus avoiding its in.
4. Section 9-205 declares, contrary to Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), that a
security interest is "not invalid or fraudulent against creditors" by reason of the debtor's
free exercise of domihion over secured collateral and its proceeds.
5. Section 9-306(4) liinits even a perfected security interest in commingled cash proceeds
to those amounts received by the debtor in the last 10 days before the institution of
insolvency proceedings; the last days before bankruptcy usually are periods of rapid cash
outflow rather than of cash accretions.
6. A security interest in after-acquired property cannot be fully perfected, under Sec.
tion 9-803, until the security interest has attached under Section 9.204. Attachment cannot
occur until the debtor has "rights in the collateral," but possibly the debtor's acquisition
of such rights, and hence the perfection of the security interest, can be accelerated by con.
sensual agreements providing for early identification and passage of title under Article 2.
See Sections 2-501(1) and 2-401. The earlier that the security interest is perfected, the
less is the risk that intervening and superior claims may be asserted against the after.
acquired collateral.
7. Typically, the secured transaction will involve the expenses of additional record
keeping and surveillance; how heavy these costs will be will depend not only on the
demands of the secured lender but also on the extent to which the debtor, for independent
reasons, has or has not been systematic in its own business operations.
8. The potential conflict of interest between secured and unsecured lenders may ill fact
be less important than it is often thought to be. A noted commentator has argued that the
secured lender may often supply advances, even over-advances, so that trade creditors
operating on open credit may be paid, and an essentially sound business may be continued,
despite temporary shortages of operating capital. I P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN e D. VAtTS, St.
cURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNiFORAI COMMERCIAL CODE § 1.06 (1967).
9. For a comprehensive discussion of these alternative security devices, see 2 G. GIL,
MORE, SECURITY INTEAESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY chs. 36, .7 (1965).
10. The Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code in its most
recent report has proffered, for optional amendment, a new Section 1-209 declaring that
a subordination agreement "does not create a security interest as against either the com.
mon debtor or a subordinated creditor." The Section goes on to provide, perhaps opti.
mistically, that it "shall be colstrtUed as declaring the law as it existed prior to the enatt,
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herent disadvantages of public disclosure and policing; but they
substitute for these known disadvantages unknown factors of uncer-
tainty and risk as to status and priority in and out of bankruptcy. And
the borrower, even under this least confining type of collateral security
device, must still contemplate the probability of extended outside
scrutiny of his internal business operations.
Any secured transaction which focuses on collateral, then, has poten-
tial drawbacks from the borrower's point of view, drawbacks which
may persuade him to investigate other sources of support for his loan
application. His most likely alternative is the suretyship contract,
which offers security to the creditor in the financial responsibility of
the surety rather than in the property and business operations of the
debtor.11 Suretyship can take a variety of forms, from the commercial
bond of a professional surety company, complete with painstaking elab-
oration of terms and conditions, to a signature-with or without quali-
fying legend--on a negotiable instrument, to an informal assumption
of responsibility for the debts of another.
Interestingly, the institution of suretyship has so far escaped the
elaborate statutory regulation which has attended collateral security
devices.'- The Uniform Commercial Code goes further toward setting
operative guidelines than has ever been done before, but even the
Code's regulation is remarkably skeletonic. The commercial surety
bond, insofar as it includes in its boilerplate an assignment of contract
rights, may or may not fall within Article 9.1 The informal surety
arrangement is left to the mercy of local interpretation of local Statutes
of Frauds. But Article 3 purports to take on, in a manner less super-
ment of this section and not as modifying it." REPORT No. 3 OF TIi PfR luMAr,-r NErrorIAL
BOARD FOR Tm UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 11-12 (1967). New York had previously enacted
an amendment to this effect. N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-209 (McKinney Supp. 1987). Scction 9-311
may inadvertently validate negative pledge clauses. See 2 G. GILlorx, SEcurirTy DiztLxxm
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 28.5 (1965).
11. Suretyship and pledge or mortgage have been available as security devices since
the days of antiquity. See Lloyd, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1917); Wigmore, The
Pledge Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas, 10 HAgv. L. REv. 321, SS9 (1896), 11
Huv. L. REv. 18 (1897).
12. The American Law Institute did sponsor a RE. FATm-r OF TnE LW OF SEcenrr"
(1941) regarding pledges and suretyship, but this Restatement has not had the impact
which some of the other Restatements have enjoyed.
13. The ambiguity arises out of Section 9-104(o, which e.'dudes from the coverage of
Article 9 "a transfer of a contract right to an assignee who is also to do the performance
under the contract." Arguably, a surety who has the option to complete construction under
a performance bond is therefore outside of Article 9. In addition, Jacobs v. Northeastern
Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965), held that the surety could avoid Article 9 if he
relied on his right to subrogation, instead of on an express assignment; pointing to Article
9's limitation to security interests created by contract (§ 9-102(21)), the court held subroga-
tion rights to be not contractual but "created by law to avoid injustice." See 2 G. GiLmorx,
SECURITY INTERES TN PERsoNAL PROPERTY ch. 36 (1965).
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ficial than that of the Negotiable Instruments Law which it replaces,
the rights and obligations of sureties who appear on short- term com-
mercial paper.
The proper relationship between the law of suretyship and the law
of negotiable instruments has long been troublesome, 4 and it is there-
fore no accident that the draftsmen of the Code felt called upon to
provide some clarification in this area. This article will examine the
extent to which the enlightenment provided by Article 3 allows a bor-
rower to choose rationally between suretyship and other security
devices.
I. The Surety and Article 3: Creation of the Relationship
Broadly defined, a surety is a party to a contract who agrees to pay
the obligation of another under some circumstances. 15 A surety may
be an individual or a corporation, a widow or a bank president, a vir-
tuous citizen motivated by charity or a calculating schemer after finan-
cial gain. The availability of any surety for any particular borrower
depends on many disparate circumstances, but at least one factor is the
accessibility to the surety of some reasonably reliable basis for assessing
the risks of his undertaking.
Article 3 of the Code deals with the surety who commits himself to
short term negotiable paper, to negotiable instrument (or instruments)
as that term is defined in Article 3.16 It does so by a general statement
of the obligations of some parties to such instruments and by other
14. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 14 HARV. L. REv. 241, 255 (1900) took It-
mediate issue with that statute's treatment of surety makers; Eaton, The Negotiable In-
struments Law: Its History and Practical Operation, 2 Mien. L. lmv. 260 (1904) defended
it. Other commentators joined in the fray. See, e.g., Turner, Revision of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, 38 YALaE L.J. 25, 45-49 (1928); Hilpert, Discharge of Latent Sureties on
Negotiable Instruments Because of Release or Extension of Time, 50 YALE L.J. 387 (1941);
J. JRANNAN, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 1120-27 (7th ed. F. 13eutel 1948); W. BirroN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES § 301 (2d ed. 1961).
15. "The term surety is very often used in the broad sense as including both technical
surety and guarantor, i.e., all obligations in which the promisor is answering for a loan
or extension of credit from the creditor to the principal debtor." L. SimxrsoN, HANDBOOK ON
THE LA-W' OF SuRErYsHiP 6-7 (1950).
16. Section 3-104 and the sections which follow it spell out the requisites for a negotia-
ble instrument within Article 3; such instruments must be signed by maker or drawer,
must contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money, must
provide for payment on demand or at a definite time, and must be payable to order or to
bearer. Section 3-102(l)(e) stipulates that "instrument" presumptively means "negotiable
instrument." Article 3, in contrast to the Negotiable Instruments Law, does not claim to be
the exclusive fountainhead of all negotiable paper, but only to govern paper which falls
within its ambit. Section'3-802 recognizes a category of quasi-negotiable paper, and Article
8 deals with long-term investment securities.
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sections which refer specifically to suretyship concepts and obligations.
Even in the latter cases, however, the text of Article 3 now eschews the
language of suretyship' 7 and speaks instead of accommodation parties, 8
guarantors:9 and others who have "a right of recourse."20 By contrast,
Article 1 includes among its many definitions in Section 1-201(40):
"'surety' includes guarantor."2 1 Directly and indirectly, Article 3 ex-
pands upon this non-definition to make a great variety of distinctions
among potential sureties on negotiable paper, distinctions which are
important because they draw statutory inferences about the scope of
suretyship liability from the form of suretyship engagement on the
instrument.
One class of signers of negotiable instruments who appear to have
the major attributes of suretyship are those who sign instruments with-
out dear indication of capacity or intention. Any such signatory auto-
matically becomes an indorser by virtue of Section 3402;2' and any
such indorser makes the engagement of Section 3414 that he will pay
if the instrument to which he has subscribed is dishonored by its desig-
nated payor.23 The indorser's liability is conditioned on certain formal
procedures, such as due presentment and proper notice,24 but these
formalities are within easy reach of any careful holder. The indorser
who pays ordinarily has a right of recourse on the instrument against
those before him, including the debtor who was to have paid32 This
description of the obligations and remedies of the indorser applies
evenhandedly to any indorser, regardless of the circumstances which
motivated the indorsement: it covers the negotiating indorsement of
a transferor of negotiable paper as well as the irregular indorsement of
17. The most central secton, Section 3-415 dealing generally with accommodation
parties, formerly described such a party as "surety for another party," but the draftsmen
were persuaded in 1956 that this referent, which continues in comment, was somehow in-
accurate. See 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDrroRIAL BOARD FOR TIE UIFoRM COM-





21. There is an especially illuminating comment: "New."
22. Section 3-402 provides: "Unless the instrument dearly indicates that a signature is
made in some other capacity it is an indorsement."
23. Section 3414(1) states: "Unless the indorsement othenvise specifies (as by such
words as "without recourse') every indorser engages that upon dishonor and any necessary
notice of dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the
time of his indorsement to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who takes it up, even
though the indorser who takes it up was not obligated to do so." A similar provision under
the Negotiable Instruments Law was its Section 66.
24. These procedures are detailed in Part 5 of Article .
25. Section 3414(1) and Section 3413(2) provide for reimbursement of the paying in.
dorser by earlier indorsers and by the drawer.
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the intentional surety. All indorsers, then, are a species of the genus
surety;2 6 but not all sureties need be indorsers.
A surety may appear on a negotiable instrument as an "accommoda-
tion party" who, pursuant to Section 3415(1), signs "in any capacity for
the purpose of lending his name to another party to it."27 "In any
capacity" means that an accommodator may sign as maker, drawer,
acceptor or indorser; but the last words of the definition require that
the accommodator act for a debtor who is himself on the instrument.
Thus, a sole maker who is in fact acting as surety for another is appar-
ently entitled to the benefits of his accommodation character if the
debtor is on the instrument as payee or indorser, but not if the paper
is, without an irregular indorsement, made directly payable to the
creditor. This is an odd qualification. Other parts of Section 3-415 "
sensibly look to notice rather than capacity in deciding when accom-
modation defenses are available. But the requirement that the debtor
appear on the instrument can hardly serve the interests of disclosure,
since the presence of the debtor as payee will not automatically reveal
the true relationship between the parties. An alternate explanation
might rest on some notion of inherent inconsistency between the un-
conditional obligation of a sole maker and the qualified undertaking
of the surety. But if that is the objection, it is hard to see how it is cured
by the appearance of the debtor on the instrument in some ambiguous
capacity; moreover, it is an objection expressly waived elsewhere in
Article 3. Under Section 8-606(1),29 suretyship defenses relating to dis-
26. Occasionally, for private reasons, one who has apparently signed as indorser may In
fact be the underlying debtor; in such a case, of course, he is not, despite the appearance of
the paper, a surety, nor does he have any rights of recourse. See Sections 3-415(5) and
3-414(2).
27. The Section in its totality reads as follows:
Section 3-415. Contract of Accommodation Party.
(1) An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the
purpose of lending his name to another party to it.
(2) When the instrument has been taken for value before it is due the accomnioda.
tion party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed even though the taker
knows of the accommodation.
(3) As against a holder in due course and without notice of the accommodation oral
proof of the accommodation is not admissible to give the accommodation party the
benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such. In other cases the ac-
commodation character may be shown by 6ral proof.
(4) An indorsement which shows that it is not in the chain of title Is notice of its
accommodation character.
(5) An accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated, and if lie pays
the instrument has a right of recourse on the instrument against such party.
28. Compare the wording of subsection (3).
29. Section 3-606(1) reads as follows:
Section 3-606. Impairment of Recourse or of Collateral.
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without
such party's consent the holder(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person
838
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charges of the principal debtor are available to anyone who is known
to have a right of recourse, either on the instrument or outside it.: o
A literal reading of Section 3-415(1) might even, perversely, serve to
deny the accommodation maker his right of recourse if he fails to insist
on his debtor's signature on the instrument. A better way out would be
to ignore, as a draftsman's oversight,31 a qualification which is pointless
(and which in fact was deleted as erroneous from Section 3-606).32
Finally, a surety may expressly qualify his signature on the instru-
ment to which he subscribes so as to fall within the contract of guaranty
described in Section 3-416.a3 That section distinguishes between guar-
antors of payment and guarantors of collection, a distinction turning
against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of re-
course or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person the in-
strument or collateral or otherwise discharges such person, except that failure
or delay in effecting any required presentment, protest or notice of dishonor
with respect to any such person does not discharge an), party as to whom
presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf
of the party or any person against whom he has a right of recourte.
80. Comment I to Section 3-606 is explicit on this point:
1. The words "any party to the instrument" remove an uncertainty arising under the
original section. The suretyship defenses here provided are not limited to parties
who are "secondarily liable," but are available to any party who is in the position
of a surety, having a right of recourse either on the instrument or dehors it, in-
cluding an accommodation maker or acceptor known to the holder to be so.
81. The analogous provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law, Section 29, avoided
this problem by providing simply:
An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer,
acceptor or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending
his name to some other person. Such a person is liable on the instrument to a holder
for value, notwithstanding such holder at the time of taking knew him to be only
an accommodation party.
32. Earlier versions of Section 3-606 limited its protection to those known to have a
right of recourse on the instrument. The change was effected in 1957, on the advice of the
New York Law Revision Commission. See 1956 RiEcoms!M.'DATioNs OF Tim EDiroraAL BoARD
foR THE UNrFoRM CoMSIRCIAL CODE 128-29 (1957).
3. The text of Section 3-416 states:
Section 3416. Contract of Guarantor.
(1) "Payment guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that the
signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according
to its tenor without resort by the holder to any other party.
(2) "Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that the
signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according
to its tenor, but only after the holder has reduced his claim against the maker or
acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or after the
maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise apparent that it is
useless to proceed against him.
(3) Words of guaranty which do not otherwise specify guarantee payment.
(4) No words of guaranty added to the signature of a sole maker or acceptor affect his
liability on the instrument. Such words added to the signature of one of two
or more makers or acceptors create a presumption that the signature is for the
accommodation of the others.
(5) When words of guaranty are used presentment, notice of dishonor and protest
are not necessary to charge the user.
(6) Any guaranty written on the instrument is enforceable notwithstanding any
statute of frauds.
The section is new, having no counterpart in the Negotiable Instruments Law.
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upon the nature of the preconditions which trigger the guarantor's
liability. While a guarantor of payment may be required to pay upon
maturity of the instrument, a guarantor of collection may not be called
upon until the claim against maker or acceptor has been reduced to
judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied. In neither form
of guaranty may the guarantor insist, unless he does so explicitly in the
guaranty contract, upon the formalities of demand, presentment, and
notice;34 this waiver of procedural rights is significant, because a guar-
antor who indorses remains an indorser for some purposes.8 5 By contrast,
the ordinary accommodation indorser guarantees payment without
automatically waiving procedural rights, and thus occupies a stance in
this respect intermediate between guaranty of payment and of collec-
tion.3 6
All this is clear sailing until one probes a little. Section 3-416 seems
to contemplate a guarantor who dutifully follows statutory instruction
and uses words of guaranty to describe his status. Suppose some mis.
guided soul should inadvertently indorse an instrument "Joe Smith,
surety." If he is to be considered an indorsing surety but not a guar-
antor, he is entitled to presentment, notice, and perhaps protest; if he
is a guarantor, he is not. Section 3-416(3) tells us only that words of
guaranty or "equivalent words" are presumed to be guaranties of pay-
ment; it says nothing about words of suretyship. Article I's definition,
that surety includes guarantor,37 is not much more helpful and rather
suggests that some sureties are guarantors and others are not. This is
the kind of ambiguity which an Official Comment might help to re-
solve, but the comment to Section 1-201(40) is a monosyllabic "New";
and the comment to Section 3416 tells us only that the section pur-
ports to state the commercial understanding of words of guaranty-
hardly a startling improvement on the text3 Probably the fairest read-
34. See Section 3416(5).
35. Under Section 3-202(4), "Words of ...guaranty ... and the like accompanying
an indorsement do not affect its character as an indorsement."
36. Pre-Code courts regularly held that even an accommodation indorser could not be
held without alleging presentment and notice or their waiver. See, e.g., Gelman v. Pub,
Nat'l Bank, 377 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Congress Fin. Corp. v. J-K Coin Op Equip.
Co., 353 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1965); Ribac v. S & B Parts Mfg. Equip. Corp., 202
N.YS.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. 1960). Comment 1 to Section 3-415 indicates that the Code preserves
these formal rights. If the accommodation party signs as drawer, a less prevalent form of
accommodation status but one certainly still within the "in any capacity" language of
Section 3-415(1), he is still entitled to presentment and notice under Section 3-5Ol But a
drawer can complain of delay in these formalities only if the delay is prejudicial in the
sense that funds maintained with the drawee were lost because of the dawee's becoming
insolvent during the period of delay. Section 3-502(l)(b).
37. Section 1-201(40).
38. The only statutory presumption on this point, in Section 3-416, is irrelevant: it is
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ing of the language itself is that the special contract of guaranty is to
be limited to those who use the magic word, with perhaps some leeway
for variant spellings. After all, the negotiable instruments law has long
been addicted to magic words: commercial paper to be fully negotiable
must be payable "to order or to bearer";3D and it must not be "subject
to" any other agreement.40 On the other hand, the commercial sense of
such a construction is doubtful. Whatever the merits of a distinction
between surety and guarantor, the suretyship obligation is the one that
has been generally characterized as the broader, the more primary, the
less conditional of the two undertakings.4' It is therefore surprising to
discover that to sign "Joe Smith, surety" implies less liability than to
sign "Joe Smith, guarantor." One way to avoid this result would be to
find a contract of guaranty whenever suretyship status of any kind is
expressly stipulated by the addition of some appropriate words added
to a signature. Thus the co-maker or the indorser who adds some legend
of guaranty or suretyship to indicate, on the instrument itself, that he
is signing for the purpose of lending his name to another, makes the
guaranty contract, while the surety who merely affixes his signature to
the instrument without indication of special status is an accommoda-
tion party, in the language of the Code.
Such a reading of "words of guaranty" to encompass all visible sure-
ties would not only comport with general commercial sense, but would
also furnish a link now missing between the section on accommodation
parties and the provision concerning guarantors. Nowhere in the latter
section is it made explicit that the special rights and privileges of ac-
commodation status- are available to those who enter into a contract
of guaranty. Certainly those who take on extra responsibilities should
have at least the benefits of those who do not. The broader reading of
"words of guaranty" results in a balance of the equities in which
subsection (3) that "words of guaranty which do not otherwise specify guarantee pay-
ment."
39. Section 3-104(i)(d), amplified by Sections 3-110 and 3-111.
40. An instrument, to be negotiable within Article 3, must contain an unconditional
promise to pay, Section 3-104(a)(b), and promises "subject to ...any other agreement:
are not unconditional, Section 3-105(2)(a).
41. See L. SuiusoN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF SLu.Isiw §§ 5 and 6 (1950): the lia-
bility of the surety is primary, while that of the guarantor is conditional and secondary.
Neither the common law, nor modem English law, distinguishes between guaranty and
suretyship, as American courts have done. Radin, Guaranty and Suretyship, 17 CAL. L.
REv. 605, 18 CAI.TF. L. REv. 21 (1929). Radin summarizes the American distinction in the
following way: "the surety promises to pay if the principal does not; the guarantor, if be
cannot." 17 Id. 620. Most commentators have deplored the distinction, and the xsrATAE-
MENT OF SEctrry § 82 & Comment g (1941) uses the two terms synonomously.
42. For example, the right to special grounds of discharge, recogized by Section
3415(3).
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the visible surety waives formal conditions to his liability in exchange
for the preservation of suretyship defenses and subrogation rights,
while the latent surety (at least if he signs as an indorser) preserves his
right to procedural niceties but loses the benefits of special defenses
against a holder in due course who has no knowledge of his suretyship
status.
Other limitations placed by Section 3416 on the contract of guaranty
are not so easily explained away. Under the definition of Section
3-416(2),43 it is apparently impossible to guarantee the collection of a
check or draft if it is the liability of the drawer, rather than that of the
acceptor, which is being guaranteed. Why not, if collection from a
maker can be guaranteed?44 Surely, this must be simply an oversight.
Despite the apparently limiting phraseology, the reference to the un-
derlying obligor as maker or acceptor should be read as illustrative
only. Further, although guaranty of the debt of a co-maker or co-
acceptor is permissible under Section 3416(4),45 such a guaranty only
presumptively creates accommodation status. If not accommodation
status, what then? What would rebut the presumption? A generic dis-
tinction between guaranty and accommodation is particularly hard to
generate under the circumstances stipulated. Neither the accommoda-
tion co-maker nor the guarantor co-maker nor any other maker is
entitled to presentment or notice of default; all makers are equally
liable when the instrument becomes due. The non-distinction which
the Code sets up turns on signing as maker, not on the form of the
suretyship undertaking. If the draftsmen meant only that the guaran-
teeing co-maker would presumptively be entitled to reimbursement
from the underlying obligor, the clause would be unnecessary surplus-
43. The subsection states:
(2) "Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signature mean that the
signer engages that if the instrument is not paid when due he will pay it according
to its tenor, but only after the holder has reduced his claim against Me ttiiaker
or acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or after the
maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise apparent that It is
useless to proceed against him (emphasis added).
44. The Code makes much less of a distinction between drawer and maker tian did
earlier law. Although the drawer's liability (but not the maker's) Is still technically condi.
tional upon due presentment and notice, Section 3-501(l)(c), the drawer is discharged by
procedural lapses only in the event of loss of funds maintained with an insolvent drawee,
today an unlikely event. Section 3-502(l)(b). Furthermore, the maker of domiciled paper Is
absolutely assimilated to the drawer in the presentment sections of Part 5 without being
withdrawn from the accommodation and guaranty sections of Part 4.
45. Subsection (4) provides:
(4) No words of guaranty added to the signature of a sole maker or acceptor affect
his liability on the instrument. Such words added to the signature of one of two
or more makers or acceptors create a presumption that the signature is for the
accommodation of the others.
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age: any guarantor as one species of accommodation party automati-
cally has such a claim. Finally, in the first part of Section 3416(4),40 as
in Section 3415, the draftsmen had qualms about allowing a guarantor
his special status if he was the sole maker of the instrument; but here
he can retain his special status only by putting the debtor onto the
paper as co-maker, not merely by making him an indorser. Once again,
there seems no reason not to allow accommodation or guaranty paper
to take whatever form the parties choose, so long as their understanding
is adequately communicated. To insist upon the signature of the debtor
as co-maker when in fact the creditor is relying upon the credit of the
guarantor is to elevate form over substance.
One final drafting quirk in Section 3-416 is worthy of brief mention.
In an effort to reverse the occasional case holding an explicit contract
of guaranty to be within the Statute of Frauds provision about con-
tracts to answer for the debt of another,47 Section 3.416 adopts what is
universally thought to be the better position, that a negotiable instru-
ment is a sufficient writing, without express statement of consideration,
to satisfy all the legitimate purposes of the Statute.48 There is no men-
don of the effect of the Statute of Frauds on other forms of suretyship
commitment, presumably because the existing case law exempted nego-
tiable instruments from the Statute. 9 It would, however, be an unfor-
tunate mistake for a court to conclude that contracts of suretyship, by
some negative inference from Section 3416(6), must now meet the
technical requirements of the Statute.
In summary, then, Article 3 permits the assumption of suretyship
status in three ways. Suretyship may flow incidentally from the ordi-
nary rights and privileges of a negotiating indorser. The intentional
surety may sign a negotiable instrument in any capacity, with or with-
out words expressly describing his status. If he merely signs without
more, he is in the language of the Code an accommodation party; if he
signs with identifying legend, he should be deemed to have made the
special contract of a guarantor.
46. The opening sentence of Section 3-416(4) reads as follows:
No words of guaranty added to the signature of a sole maker or acceptor affect his
liability on the instrument.
47. See, e.g., M.J. Wallrich Land & Lumber Co. v. Ebenreiter, 216 Wis. 140, 256 N.W.
775 (1934).
48. The wording is to be found in subsection (6) of Section 3416:
(6) Any guaranty written on the instrument is enforcible notwithstanding any statute
of frauds.
49. "The statute of frauds is applicable only to informal contracts. Among thoe to
which it is not applicable are contracts under seal, recogniznces, and negotiable in-
struments." 2 A. CoRaB, CoyRmAcrs § 360, at 251 (1950); see also id. § 280, at .14.
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IL The Engagement of the Surety
Once suretyship status on a negotiable instrument has been achieved,
what is the extent of the surety's undertaking? Of course, although the
point continues to be litigated,50 suretyship per se is an engagement
and not a defense, a commitment to pay and not an excuse for nonpay-
ment. The surety is bound in whatever capacity, and with what-
ever qualifications, he has affixed his signature to the negotiable instru-
ment in suit; notice of his suretyship status neither defeats due course
holding nor insulates the surety from liability.
A. Takers
To whom is the surety liable? He must pay "takers."r1 "Taker" is a
term undefined in the Code, but presumably is intended to include
those physically in possession of a negotiable instrument who do not
qualify as holders.52 Since "holder" is generously defined in Section
1-201(20) as a "person who is in possession of . . . an instrument ...
drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in
blank," the residual class is not large. A payee, for example, is clearly
a holder, and under Section 3-302(2) may even be a holder in due
course. 3 But an indorser who is forced to take up an instrument upon
default of the maker or drawer may be a mere transferee if he lacks
the indorsement of the person whom he has paid.64 Such an indorser is
and ought to be entitled as a "taker" to hold a prior surety."s
50. The litigation reflects a basic confusion between the defense, "I am only a surety
and therefore not liable," and the defense, "I am a surety and therefore entitled to special
defenses not available to other parties to negotiable instruments." For examples of the
first type of defense, see, e.g., G.E. Conkey Co. v. Bochmann, 220 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Iowa
1963); Civic Fin. Co. v. Meintzer, 137 Colo. 572, 328 P.2d 379 (1958); Conn v. Boulevard
Nat'l Bank, 148 So. 2d 758 (Fla. App. 1963); Seelig v. Brusso, 121 So. 2d 28 (La. App.
1960); Sun Oil Co. v. Redd Auto Sales Inc., 339 Mass. 384, 159 N.E.2d 111 (1959); Welbtlt
Concrete Constr. Co. v. Kornicki, 26 App. Div. 2d 661, 272 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1966); Macy v.
Oswald, 198 Pa. Super. 435, 182 A.2d 94 (1962).
51. Section 3-415(2) defines the surety's liability as follows:
(2) When the instrument has been taken for value before it is due the accommodation
party is liable in the capacity in which he has signed even though the taker
knows of the accommodation.
By contrast, under Section 3-415's antecedent in the Negotiable Instruments Law, Section
29, accommodation parties were liable to holders for value, a position intermediate betwcen
liability to takers and liability to holders in due course.
52. Compare the definition of a transferee in Section 3-201(1):
(1) Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor
has therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud
or illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a
defense or claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later
holder in due course.
53. Section .3-02(2) states flatly: "A payee may be a holder in due course."
54. Section 3-603(2) provides:
(2) Payment or satisfaction may be made with the consent of the holder by any person
including a stranger to the instrument. Surrender of the instrument to such a
person gives him the rights of a transferee (Section 3-201).
55. In James Talcott, Inc. v. Fred Ratowsky Associates, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 624, 84 Dauph.
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Must the surety pay any and all takers? An answer to this question
involves a construction, possibly a reconstruction, of Section 3-415(2).
The subsection provides: "When the instrument has been taken for
value before it is due the accommodation party is liable in tie capacity
in which he signed even though the taker knows of the accommoda-
tion" (emphasis added). Does this mean that only a taker who has him-
self taken the instrument for value before it is due can sue the surety?
Or do the introductory words, the "when" clause, describe instead con-
ditions for valid issue ab initio? Comment 3ro indicates that the value
phraseology was designed to avoid problems of past consideration, so
that the timing of the procuring of the surety's signature would not be
determinative of his liability; and that the "before it is due" language
was designed to accommodate a principle of suretyship law "by which
the obligation of the surety is terminated at the time limit unless and
in the meantime the obligation of the principal has become effective."
So while the phrasing of the text, particularly the rhythm of "taken"
and "taker," looks toward qualification of the individual daimant, the
drift of the comment is toward conditions of initial validation.
Perhaps the best way to arrive at a sound construction is to test these
alternatives in the context of a series of typical hypothetical cases. Sup-
pose, first, that A is an accommodating co-maker for B on a promissory
note for $10,000 payable to the order of C, due six months after date.
C correctly pays the $10,000 consideration to B, who promptly disap-
pears, physically or financially. If C holds the paper until maturity,
there is no doubt that C can recover from A. But suppose that C nego-
tiates the paper to D, who in turn negotiates it to E, who holds it until
maturity. When E discovers that B will not pay, he is likely to have
recourse to D. 57 What is the situation if D, the paying indorser, having
258 (C.P. 1965), the plaintiff failed to qualify as a holder since one of the indorse-
ments necessary to his title was on a separate piece of paper insufficiently attached to the
principal note to qualify as an allonge. Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiff, as a
taker for value before the instrument was due, was entitled to recover from an accom-
modation party. In most instances, the paying indors-er can avoid the qualification problem,
since he is entitled to cancel intermediate indorsements not neceosary to his title and thus
to resume his former status as holder. See Section 3-208.
56. Comment 3 states:
The obligation of the accommodation party is supported by any consideration for
which the instrument is taken before it is due. Subsection (2) is intended to change
occasional decisions holding that there is no sufficient consideration where an accom-
modation party signs a note after it is in the hands of a holder who has given value.
The party is liable to the holder in such a case even though there is no extension
of time or other concession. This is consistent with the provision as to antecedent
obligations as consideration (Section 3-408). The limitation to "before it is due" is one
of suretyship law, by which the obligation of the surety is terminated at the time
limit unless in the meantime the obligation of the principal has become effectie.
57. D will be liable to E if he has indorsed the paper without qualification. under
Section 3-414(1); even if he has indorsed the paper "without recourse. he might still be
liable for breach of one of the warranties of Section 3-417(2), but this is an unlikely source
of liability under the facts here stipulated.
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satisfied E, now wants to hold the surety, A, responsible? Although D
has taken the instrument for value from E, nonetheless, by paying E he
has himself taken it after maturity. In order to protect D's right of
recovery, which seems eminently reasonable and totally consistent with
A's commitment to negotiable paper, it seems preferable to adopt a
construction of the "when" clause which attributes its stipulations to
conditions of issue. So read, C's timely taking shores up D's claim,
whereas on the alternate reading D, taking solely in his own right,
might be time-barred.
Case 2 is a simple variant of the Case 1 model. Suppose D's troubld
stems not from post-maturity taking, but rather from lack of value.
D is a donee, who was given the instrument by C in a sudden burst of
generosity. Does C's generosity, intended to benefit D, in fact serve to
release A? Again, if the "when" clause is read to contain only condi-
tions of issue, the preferable result is obtained; i.e., C can make the
gift without accidentally relieving A of his commitment.
Case 3 is a reverse twist on Case 1. Suppose C, having taken the note
described, negotiates it to D without ever paying B one cent. Unless D
is a holder in due course, the example is trivial.8 But if D has taken the
instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of C's mis-
conduct, D should ordinarily be able to enforce the instrument. After
all, what defenses are more typically "personal," and hence unavailable
against a holder in due course, than failure of consideration or condi-
tion?59 As long as A's accommodation status is not known to D-if, for
example, A has simply signed as co-maker without identifying legend
-it is clear that even if the "when" clause describes conditions of issue,
non-fulfillment of these conditions is no impediment to D's right of
recovery. Of course, D could just as easily himself qualify as a taker
"for value and before it is due"; a holder in due course is all that and
more."0 So this case is neutral, and can be resolved correctly whichever
interpretation of the subsection is adopted.
58. If D is an ordinary holder, he is subject, under Section 3-306(c), to the maker's
defense of absence of consideration.
59. See Section 3-305(2) & Comment 3.
60. Compare the qualifications of Section 3-415(2) with these of Section 8-802. The
principal omissions relate to qualifications of innocence: the holder in due course must
take in good faith and without notice of defenses. Whether some good faith Implications
might not be read into Section 3-415 is an open question. Arguably, actual knowledge of
some conduct beyond the scope of the contemplated accommodation status, which still
might not qualify as a "discharge" under the terms of Section 8-415(3), would defeat the
rights of a particular taker. After all, good faith is an obligation which attaches to every
contract or duty under the Code, under Section 1-203. Under analogous circumstances,
Article 9 draws a distinction between knowledge of the existence of a security Interest,
and knowledge of its violation. See Section 9-307(1).
846
Val. 77: 833, 1968
Suretyship Under Article 3 of UCC
This brings us to Case 4, in which, as in Case 3, C wrongfully nego-
tiates to D, a holder in due course, an instrument for which C has never
paid A or B. In this case, however, A has signed with the words "co-
maker and surety." Now D, although still innocent of C's failure to
pay B, although still purchasing an apparently regular and valuable
instrument, has notice of A's accommodation status. And D may now
be vulnerable to another subsection of Section 3415, subsection (3),
which relates to A's ability to invoke "the benefit of discharges depen-
dent on his character" as an accommodation party. Subsection (3) can
hurt D if it means that suretyship discharges are a defense against even
a holder in due course who is alerted to the presence of a surety, and if
C's fraudulent conduct is a basis of discharge for a surety. Whatever
the merits of such an expansive reading of the discharge provisions,
and I think they are very few,01 the discharge provisions put D in jeo-
pardy only if the "when" clause refers to conditions of issue, since if
the clause relates, instead, to D's own qualifications as in Case 3, he
dearly has more than met its specifications,
To summarize, the position that the surety must pay any taker if
that taker gave timely value for the instrument finds support in the
case of the paying indorser and of the donee, and is consistent with
protection for the holder in due course of paper on which the surety
is latent. But it may entail difficulties for a holder purchasing paper
with a visible surety. It should not, even there, cause trouble if the
discharge section is narrowly read, but it may at the very least give rise
to uncertainty and hence to litigation.
There may be an avenue of escape from even this limited uncer-
tainty, a way to protect both the paying indorser and the donee, and
the holder in due course of an instrument with a visible surety. If the
"when" clause describes the characteristics of the taker rather than
conditions of issue, why must it be limited to the personal characteris-
tics of the taker who sues on the note? Obviously, if he is a holder in
due course, he needs no further assistance. But the paying indorser in
Case I is a taker whose credentials are, prima facie, not so secure; never-
theless, he should be able to use the "shelter" doctrine to inherit E's
timely taking, so that his taking becomes vicariously timely. Under
Section 3-201, "[t]ransfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such
rights as the transferor had therein,"O and payment to a holder is a
61. See pp. 863-67 & notes 129-44 infra.
62. Section 3-201(l) in its totality reads as follows:
Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee such rights as the transferor has
therein, except that a transferee who has himself been a party to any fraud or
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transfer under Section 3-603(2).6 The shelter principle would equally
protect D as direct purchaser of an overdue instrument from C-or as
C's donee-as long as C had properly given value to B before the paper
expired. In other words, the shelter doctrine is a bridge between condi-
tions of issue and qualifications of claimants. If the suretyship contract
has once become totally and correctly operative, subsequent takers in
good faith acquire adequate qualifications by transfer. But if the surety-
ship contract was defectively formed, it can only be enforced in the
hands of, or through shelter under, a taker whose qualifications are
self-acquired, such as, notably, the holder in due course.
This resolution still leaves some takers unprotected. The donee of
an imperfect suretyship instrument has received a worthless gift and
must put up with his disappointment. The purchaser of an overdue
instrument from a defrauding payee has failed to heed the warnings
said to inhere in overdue paper.64 But what about the taker who meets
the literal requirements of taking for value before maturity, but who
is not a holder in due course, say because he is missing an indorsement
or because he had notice of some claim or defense entirely unrelated
to the surety? As to him, may the surety who has signed as co-maker,
with or without legend, raise personal defenses such as failure of
consideration or breach of condition on delivery, or is the accommoda-
tion party unconditionally liable in the capacity in which he has signed?
While Section 3-415(2) seems to opt for liability in this situation, the
outcome is by no means clear.
B. Parol Evidence
The conclusion that the surety is responsible to a great many poten-
tial takers does not as yet define the scope of his undertaking to this
large class. Two factors important to the surety's commitment have
already been identified: the capacity in which the surety signed the
negotiable instrument, and the presence or absence of any legend on
the instrument limiting or enlarging the surety's obligation. Is the
surety's liability conclusively defined by these two determinants, or may
illegality affecting the instrument or who as a prior holder had notice of a defense
or claim against it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder in due
course.
63. Section 3-603(2) provides:
Payment or satisfaction may be made with the consent of the holder by any person
including a stranger to the instrument. Surrender of the instrument to such a person
gives him the rights of a transferee (Section 3-201).
64. See Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper, 31 HARV. L. RaV. 1104 (1918): Morrison,
Equities of Ownership and Equities of Defence in Overdue Paper, 5 TuLANE. L. Rlm. 287
(193).
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it be altered by special agreement dehors the instrument? That is, can
the contracting parties effectively condition or extend the surety's en-
gagement without detailing their agreement on the instrument itself?
To some extent, this question is subsumed under the principle of pro-
tection for due course holding: no holder in due course of a bona fide
negotiable instrument is bound by any special arrangements of which
he is innocent. To a holder in due course, a surety is and must be that
which he appears to be upon inspection of the instrument.65 But the
issue may arise in the context of a taker who is not as exceptionally
qualified as a holder in due course and who may yet not be one of the
immediate parties to the negotiated deal. The question then becomes
one of the applicability of the parol evidence rule, a question on which
Article 3 of the Code, in contradistinction to Article 2,c8 is remarkably
reticent.
The decision of the draftsmen not to codify the relationship between
the parol evidence rule and negotiable instruments law T is easy to
understand. Seventy years ago, Thayer introduced his famous discus-
sion of the parol evidence rule with the observation that "Few things
are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties." '0 s If the reported
cases are any guide, the state of the law has not improved. Even a cur-
sory examination of recent appellate litigation discloses widespread
inconsistency and confusion. 9 The one thing that is eminently clear
is that the problem is not about to fade away.
65. See 3 A. CoRxmN, CoiRuAcrs § 597, at 510-14 (1960) and Section 3-119.
66. See Section 2-202.
67. Comment I to Section 3-119 states categorically:
This Article does not attempt to state general rules as to when an instrument may be
varied or affected by parol evidence, except to the extent indicated by the comment
to the preceding section.
Section 3-118 provides rules of construction for ambiguous instruments, and its comment
indicates that these rules are not subject to variation (other than by reformation) "by any
proof that any party intended the contrary." Despite the comment, the text may provide
some openings for parol evidence through its preconditions relating to ambiguity.
68. J. THaER, EvmEcE 390 (1898).
69. The sponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code have, with some regularity, taken
the position that they would not codify where state law was in marked conflict. For ex-
ample, Article 2 has been noticeably reticent about problems of privity; even last year, with
the privity battle essentially won, the Permanent Editorial Board could not bring itself to
provide more than optional variants for Section 2-318. UNIFoRM Lmws A,;NoTATzD, UI-
FORM. CoMrarencU_ CODE § 2-318 (Supp. 1967). Similarly, Article 6 takes no position on the
important question whether the bulk sales buyer should have an) responsibility in the
disbursement of proceeds of the bulk transfer, see optional Section 6-106, and Article 3
remains cautiously neutral about the consequences of domiciling negotiable paper, see
Section 3-121. These are all questions of substance, entirely unlike the variant filing systems
under Article 9, see Section 9-401, which oerely allow local option to regulate the place
of filing. Perhaps excessive codification would have jeopardized widespread enactment, or
stimulated even more wholesale local amendments than the Code has already received.
Still, it is not easy to demonstrate that the parol evidence rule had achieved substantially
greater consensus as it affected the law of sales than as it dealt with negotiable instruments.
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The response of the draftsmen to these complexities was to intervene
intermittently, to allow some parol evidence some of the time by statu.
tory fiat, and to leave the rest to judicial ingenuity. Article 3 contains
only one provision addressing itself generally to the parol evidence
rule, Section 3-119(1),70 which authorizes variation of the terms of an
instrument by resort to a written agreement executed as part of the
same transaction. To this extent, the Code recognizes explicitly that
negotiable instruments are often merely partial integrations, precluded
by the formal requisites of negotiability from containing a complete
and detailed statement of the contracting parties' total agreement.
Several points about Section 3-119 are noteworthy. Admissible agree-
ments are not restricted to those which add supplementary terms con-
sistent with the instrument; instead, the instrument may be modified
or otherwise "affected," presumably a polite word for "altered," by the
contents of the written agreement. Furthermore, no special presump-
tions or burdens of proof devalue the written agreement where it
conflicts with the negotiable instrument. The written agreement is ad-
missible only insofar as it was "executed as part of the same transac-
tion," but this requirement of contemporaneous execution has a fair
amount of free play within it. Finally, the written agreement is effec-
tive only between "the obligor and his immediate obligee or any trans-
feree" or a holder in due course with "notice of the limitation when he
took the instrument." This limitation is clear enough when it protects
the innocent holder in due course, but what does it mean for a holder
not in due course (but not a mere transferee), for example a post-
maturity purchaser for value? Is such a holder, like a mere transferee,
bound by conditions of which the negotiable instrument gives him no
warning and of which he otherwise has no notice? Literally read, the
section allows him to enforce the instrument as written; in "transferee"
the draftsmen were using a term of art not synonymous with "holder.""
As a matter of commercial sense, however, this distinction is not en-
tirely persuasive. Nothing in the presence or absence of an endorsement
is specifically responsive to the issue of the admissibility of parol evi-
dence, unless the process of transfer without negotiation is to be con-
70. Section 3-119 reads as follows:
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any transferee the terms
of an instrument may be modified or affected by any other written agreement
executed as a part of the same transaction, except that a holder in due course is
not affected by any limitation of his rights arising out of the separate written
agreement if he had no notice of the limitation when he took the instrument.(2) A separate agreement does not affect the negotiability of an instrument.
71. The status of a transferee is defined in Section 3-201.
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sidered so atypical and uncommercial as to be uniquely suspect and
hence hypervulnerable to any arguably legitimate defense. But else-
where Article 3 takes neither a particularly dim view of transferees nor
an especially exalted view of holders not in due course.72 A resolution
which treats ordinary holders like transferees, for this purpose, in order
to effectuate the original intent of the contracting parties, is therefore
to be preferred. A court could arrive at this result, either by disregard-
ing the technical limitations on the definition of a transferee, or by
considering the holder not in due course as a casus omissus, to be
treated like the transferee by analogy. Since the ambit of the section is
in any case carefully confined to contemporaneous and written intru-
sions on the negotiable instrument, a somewhat expanded reading of
what parties are affected by outside agreements is not inappropriate.
Article 3's remaining provisions about the admissibility of parol evi-
dence are more episodic. Only Section 8415(3) 73 refers to the problem
in text; and it provides only that the surety may introduce "oral proof"
to demonstrate his accommodation character against anyone but a
holder in due course without notice of the accommodation to obtain
"the benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such." The
scope of the beneficial discharges is left undefined. A number of sec-
tions invite the parties to vary by special agreement 74 the statutory
72. Compare Section 3-306 with Section 3-201.
73. The text of the entirety of Section 3415(3) reads as follows:
As against a holder in due course and without notice of the accommodation oral proof
of the accommodation is not admissible to give the accommodation party the benefit
of discharges dependent on his character as such. In other cases the accommodation
character may be shown by oral proof.
74. Article 1 provides, for all of the Code, in Section 1-102:(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underl)ing pur-
poses and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transac-
tions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom,
usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as other.
wise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence,
reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not mani-
festly unreasonable.(4) The presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words "unless othenvise
agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of other pro.
visions may not be varied by agreement under subsection (3).
(5) In this Act unless the context otherwise requires
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural include
the singular;(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the neuter, and
when the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may refer to any
gender.
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presumptions which attach to such diverse subjects as indorsement,
assignment, presentment, capacity and recourse. Thus the parties may
determine privately who is entitled to an indorsement 7r and who is
liable to an indorser"o when a check or a draft is an assignment;" when
presentment, notice of dishonor, or protest are required; TM whether to
qualify ambiguous representations of personal liability;70 whether to
consent to extension of payment terms, or impairment of collateral.80
Although none of these sections explicitly refers to parol evidence, it
would certainly be wrong to interpolate into them limitations on the
permissible form of variance which they do not themselves contain.81
They should all be read to permit oral or written modification.
One other group of sections could also be construed to invite parol
75. Section 3-201(3) provides:
Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value of an instrument not then payable
to bearer gives the transferee the specifically enforceable right to have the unqualified
indorsement of the transferor....
76. Under Section 3-414(2):
Unless they otherwise agree indorsers are liable to one another in the order In which
they indorse, which is presumed to be the order in which their signatures appear
on the instrument.
77. Section 3-409(1) provides:
A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the
hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the
instrument until he accepts it.
78. Section 3-511(2)(a) states:
Presentment or notice or protest as the case may be is entirely excused when
(a) the party to be charged has waived it expressly or by implication either before
or after it is due ....
Furthermore, under Section 3-503, the time for presentment is "determined by the nature
of the instrument, any usage of banking or trade and the facts of the particular case ....
79. Section 3-403 deals with the availability of parol evidence to a signatory who caihns
that he signed only in a representative capacity without personal liability. Its subsection
(2) lays down the following guidelines:
An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person represented
nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is personally
obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does not show
that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the instrument
does not name the person represented but does show that the representative
signed in a representative capacity.
80. Section 3-606 allows consent to vitiate the defenses it provides against impairment
of recourse or collateral; it states, in subsection (1):
The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person
against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recourse
or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person the instrument
or collateral or otherwise discharges such person, except that failure or delay
in effecting any required presentment, protests or notice of dishonor with
respect to any such person does not discharge any party as to whom present-
ment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf
of the party or any person against whom he has a right of recourse.
81. In several instances, comment accompanying the relevant section makes this
abundantly dear. Comment 6 to Section 3-201 states that "the understanding [about tile
type of indorsement] may be implied from conduct, from past practice, or from the cir.
cumstances of the transaction." Comment 3 to the presentment section, 3.511, says that
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testimony where relevant. These are the sections that spell out the vari-
ous defenses available to those called upon to pay a negotiable instru-
ment. Certainly the so-called real defenses, which are effective even
against a holder in due course, will rarely arise out of written docu-
ments.82 And the personal defenses, to which a holder not in due course
is subject, may equally be provable by oral testimony insofar as they
qualify as "defenses... available in an action on a simple contract" or
as "want or failure of consideration, non-performance of any condition
precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose."83 Finally,
defenses which arise out of incorrect completion or material alteration
are presumably provable by whatever evidence, oral or written, indi-
cates the original intention of the contracting parties.8s
"[the waiver may be express or implied, oral or written, and before or after the pro'
ceeding waived is due." The comment to Section 3-402 spels out the ircumstances underwhich parol evidence is admissible to carif whether a signature in an ambiguous capacty
is that of an indorser. And Comment 4 to Section 3-414 permits parol evidence to show
the order of liability among indorsers.
82. Of course the parol evidence rule does not immunize so flawed an integration from
parol attack. See 3 A. Comm, CoN-RAcrs § 580 (1960).
83. Section 3-306 stipulates:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instrument
subject to
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action on a simple
contract; and(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance of any con-
dition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose (Section 3-408);
and(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the instrument ac-
quired it by theft, or that payment or satisfaction to such holder would be
inconsistent with the terms of a restrictive indorsement. The claim of any third
person to the instrument is not othervise available as a defense to any party
liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the action for such party.
Section 3-408, in turn, provides, in a section titled "Consideration":
Want or failure of consideration is a defense as against any person not having the
rights of a holder in due course (Section 3-305), except that no consideration is neces-
sary for an instrument or obligation thereon given in pa)ment or as security for an
antecedent obligation of any kind. Nothing in this section shall be taken to displace
any statute outside this Act under which a promise is enforceable notwithstanding
lack or failure of consideration. Partial failure of consideration is a defense pro tanto
whether or not the failure is in an ascertained or liquidated amount.
84. The alteration section is Section 3-407:(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the contract of any
party thereto in any respect, including any such change in(a) the number of relations of the parties; or(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized; or(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of it.
(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges
any party whose contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or is
precluded from asserting the defense;(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument may be enforced
according to its original tenor, or as to incomplete instruments according to
the authority given.
(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the instrument ac-
cording to its original tenor, and when an incomplete instrument has been com-
pleted, he may enforce it as completed.
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Equipped with all these various sections which deal directly or in-
directly with aspects of the parol evidence rule, it would seem that the
contracting parties and the courts should have fairly adequate guidance
in this complex field. Perhaps the Article 3 solution is not as neat as
that of Article 2, but that is a mere stylistic quibble. To be sure, it may
take a lawyer a little longer to find an Article 3 answer to a question
about the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence, but then a
little good hard research is what lawyers are for. If an answer is ulti-
mately forthcoming, the draftsmen cannot be seriously faulted.
Unfortunately, however, when Article 3's provisions are tested
against the issues actually raised by recent case law, they seem to avoid
rather than to illuminate those areas in which the cases are most in
conflict. Some 60 cases in the last ten years discuss the impact of the
parol evidence rule on negotiable instruments signed by sureties,86 The
cases show marked differences in approach from one state to another,
as well as considerable subtlety within many courts in distinguishing
closely related fact situations. These are obviously cases which courts,
torn between protecting a well-meaning surety and a legitimate credi-
tor, have sought to handle cautiously and carefully. The Code will not
do much to help them.
The cases uniformly permit the surety to introduce parol evidence
on two issues. First, he may argue orally about the identity of the party
accommodated in order to defeat his liability to such a party regardless
of apparent commitments on the negotiable instrument. " Courts rarely
believe that the payee was the beneficiary of accommodation by the co-
maker, but they are open to persuasion. Section 3-415 in subsections (3)
and (4) is clear that accommodation status may be proved orally and
that the accommodating surety is not liable to the party accommodated,
but it does not expressly make the link that the identity of the accom-
modated party is an integral aspect of accommodation status and hence
provable by parol evidence. Still, buttressed by the uniformity of the
85. Part of the research design for this article consisted of reading, seriatim, all of the
cases involving sureties on negotiable instruments which the West system had recently
collected in the Seventh Decennial Digest and in the first 3 volumes of the subsequent
General Digest, principally under the heading of Bills and Notes. This process unearthed
some 200 cases, and while it was undoubtedly not exhaustive, it was at the very, least
an illustrative cross-section of the litigation in this area. How much the sample is skewed
by reliance primarily on appellate court reports, and by the selectivity inherent in the
West system of indexing, is hard to evaluate.
86. See, e.g., Colamatteo v. Schenkenberger, 163 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Wis. 1958); Giberson
v. Moore, 35 Ill. App. 2d 175, 182 N.E.2d 767 (1962); Town & Country Shoes Fed. Credit
Union v. Cramer, 350 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. App. 1961); Claremont Paper Corp. v. Wilson, 166
N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Burkhart, 401 'a.
535, 165 A.2d 612 (1960); Blackpipe State Bank v. Grass, 78 S.D. 551, 105 N.W.2d 442 (1960);
Ward v. Vaughn, 298 S.W.2d 862 (rex. Civ. App. 1957).
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prior decisions under a provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law
which was no better drafted and by the admissibility of parol evidence
under other similar circumstances, courts should continue to hear ex-
trinsic evidence on the question of the identity of the accommodated
party.8 7 Second and similarly, although the surety gains no immunity
from his own lack of compensation, he can rightfully rely on any evi-
dence, written or oral, to complain to a holder not in due course that
no one ever gave consideration to anyone connected with the instru-
ment.88 Here again, the result reached by the case laws8 is consistent
with the text of Section 3-415 (and confirmed by the accompanying
cross reference to Section 3-408), although not literally commanded by
the text.
Where the case law is divided, the Code's backhanded treatment of
parol evidence is more likely to give trouble. Consider the case of the
surety who alleges that he signed the instrument only because of a
special understanding that he would never be held personally liable.
Of course, if he neither knew nor had reason to believe that he was
undertaking a commitment on a negotiable instrument, there has been
a fraud in the factum, a real defense against any taker, and hence the
evidence of special inducement is admissible. 0 But if that threshold
87. One court has so held, without appreciable difficulty. United Refrigerator Co. v.
Applebaum, 410 Pa. 210, 189 A.2d 253 (1963).
88. See discussion at p. 845 supra.
89. See, e.g., Hopper v. American Nat'1 Bank, 209 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1962); Colorado
Nat'l Bank v. Bohm, 286 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1961); Brice v. Herrman, 128 A.2d 790 (D.C.
Mun. App. 1957); Jook v. Worak, 131 Ind. App. 36, 169 N.E.2d 128 (1960); Howell v.
Ablah, 188 Kan. 244, 361 P.2d 872 (1961); Hutchison v. Boney, 72 N.M. 194, 382 P.2d 525
(1963); Perry v. Riske, 2 'Wis. 2d 377, 86 N.W.2d 429 (1957).
90. In the period covered by my research, I found no cases alleging such fraud, but
parol evidence was allowed in support of a related defense, duress and illegality, in a case
in which accommodation makers alleged that they had been coerced into signing a note
because of a threat that their brother would otherwise be prosecuted and jailed for check
kiting. Bank of Tucson v. Adrian, 245 F. Supp. 595 (D. Minn. 19655), affd, 351 F.2d 949(8th Cir. 1965).
The substantive provision of the Code is Section 3-305, providing.
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not dealt
except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapadty, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as renders
the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument with
neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of its
character or its essential terms; and(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the in-
strnent.
For a discussion of the pre-Code case law, see IV. BnrroN, HANDOOK OF Trm LkW OF
BITS AND No'rs § 130 (2d ed. 1961).
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question is resolved against the surety, will he be allowed to testify
that he signed with the intention of taking on no liability?
There are a surprising number of cases like this, involving less stereo-
typed defendants than the familiar little old lady in distress. Sometimes
the surety argues that he signed simply to evidence his receipt of notice
of loans to the principal obligor,9' or that for some other reason short
of fraud in the factum he did not fully understand the nature of his
commitment. 2 At other times, the surety alleges that he was induced
to sign on the strength of blanket assurances of immunity. 3 Occasion-
ally, sureties seek to explain why they believed such inherently im-
plausible promises of immunity: the surety's signature was requested
in order to give the co-maker a sense of responsibility 4 the surety
would not have to pay because there was adequate outside collateral
or because he would be responsible only for the collateral9 or because
someone else would pay.07 The surety may try finally to escape liability
by describing as fraudulent the promises that induced him to sign. 8
In the reported litigation involving these variants of the plea of "who,
me?" the majority of courts have been exceedingly reluctant to permit
parol evidence to negate the written commitment to pay. But there are
exceptions, among them the not inconsequential courts of Illinois,
California and Maryland.19 The Uniform Commercial Code has noth-
91. See, e.g., Marinelli v. Weaver, 187 So. 2d 690 (Fla. App. 1966); cf. United States v.
Farrington, 172 F. Supp. 797 (D. Mass. 1959) (non-ncgotiable guaranty).
92. See General Refrigerator & Store Fixture Co. v. Fry, 393 Pa. 15, 141 ANd 836 (1958).
93. See Colamatteo v. Schenkenberger, 163 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Wis. 1958); United States
v. Cahoon, 151 F. Supp. 584 (E.D.N.C. 1957); Rosenborough v. Phillips, V89 S.W.2d 593
(rex. Civ. App. 1965); Giberson v. Moore, 35 I1. App. 2d 175, 182 N.E.2d 767 (1962).
94. See Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bohm, 286 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1961).
95. Snowden v. Franklin Natl Bank, 838 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1964); Consolidated Vending
Co. v. Turner, 267 N.C. 576, 148 S.E.2d 531 (1966).
96. Alban Tractor Co. v. Harrison, 228 Md. 632, 180 A.2d 862 (1962).
97. United States v. Cahoon, 151 F. Supp. 584 (E.D.N.C. 1957).
98. He may allege either general misrepresentations about the surety's future liability
(see, e.g., Snowden v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 338 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1964); Giberson v. Moore,
35 I1. App. 2d 175, 182 N.E.2d 767 (1962)) or specific evasion of relevant inquiries about
the debtor's status or prospects, (see, e.g., Atlantic Bank v. Carnegie Hall Corp., 25 App,
Div. 2d 301, 268 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1966) (misinformation of contemplated use of procceds of
guaranteed note); Modem Finance Co. v. Crawford, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 364, 91 Ohio L. Abs.
245, 192 N.E.2d 70 (1960) (non-disclosure of debtor's default on outstanding loan)). These
are all cases of direct dealings; fraud or duress by someone other than the enforcing
creditor is no defense for substantive grounds, United States v. Spice 'N' Nice Inc., 26
F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
99. Of the cases cited above in notes 91-98, most refused to admit parol evidence.
Colamatteo is ambiguous, finding insufficient evidence to support the alleged oral agree.
ment that the defendant would be held harmless. The two cases of speclfic misrepresenta-
tion, Atlantic Bank and Modern Finance invoke the general inapplicability of the parol
evidence rule to integrations flawed by fraud. See 3 A. CoaBiN, CONTRAars § 580 (1960).
How wide an exception they provide depends upon how easy it is, under local law, to
allege misrepresentation, whether, for example, misrepresentations must be intentionally
misleading to be actionable. But the Bohm case, under California law, made directly ad-
missible an oral promise that the co-maker would never be asked to pay but was being
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lug to say of direct relevance to this question. Not surprisingly, the two
reported Code cases arrive at opposite results. Deems v. Wilson 00 found
authority in Section 3-415 for admitting testimony of the accommoda-
tion co-maker that she had signed merely as witness to the signature of
the other maker, a minor; Held v. Moore'0 ' refused to allow a guaran-
tor to testify that he did not understand the capacity in which he signed
a note. Both cases rely on prior state law concerning admissibility of
evidence.
Pre-Code cases were more sympathetic to the surety who instead of
claiming total immunity couched his argument for non-liability in
terms of a conditional commitment. The surety has regularly been per-
mitted to contradict by oral testimony his apparently unconditional
paper obligation by showing that he delivered the paper to the payee
for some express and unfulfilled purpose. The paper may have been
delivered so that the payee could discount it, 10 2 or get a license, 0 3 or
the payee might have been told that the surety would not be liable
unless co-signers were obtained,10 4 or property released. 1 3 In some sit-
uations, the payee is the party accommodated and is vulnerable to parol
evidence on that ground. But in others, he is merely a disappointed
creditor whose claim against the surety is a good deal more precarious
than an appraisal of the instrument would suggest. The courts admit-
ting parol evidence to defeat the creditor have often relied on Section
16 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which expressly sanctioned the
asked to sign only to add a sense of responsibility to the other maker. And the Mar)land
court in the Alban Tractor Co. case saw no difficulty in parol testimony of a promise that
liability would be limited to return of secured collateral. Perhaps the broadest basis for
admission was the court's holding in Giberson that:
If there was a misrepresentation, if there was fraud, if there was no consideration,
if the note was signed as an accommodation for the payee on the promise that de-
fendant Javancie would never be called upon or forced to pay the note, even though
Moore failed to pay, all these matters or any of them go to the requirements for a
valid and legal obligation, and although prima facie the note is presumed a legal obli-
gation, parol testimony is admissible to rebut the presumption.
35 Ill. App. 2d at 180-81, 182 N.E2d at 769-70.
100. 114 Ga. App. 341, 151 S.E.2d 230 (1966).
101. 59 Lanc. L. Rev. 111 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
102. See Cross v. Miner, 207 Tenn. 239, 338 S.V.2d 619 (1960); Heights Say. Ass'n v.
Cordes, 412 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
103. See Schulte Transp. Co. v. Hewitt, 299 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. App. 1957); Parrillo
v. Siravo, 225 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1967).
104. See McMahon v. Weesner, 254 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1966); Associates Discount
Corp. v. Washington, 121 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 1960).
105. See Evans v. United Benefit Fire Ins. Co., 192 So. 2d 87 (Fla. App. 1966); Greater
Valley Terminal Corp. v. Goodman, 405 Pa. 605, 176 A.2d 408 (1962). But the Texas courts
have been more reluctant to permit such testimony. Hood v. First Nat!1 Bank, 410 S.W.2d
449 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (endorser cannot defend that wrong property mortgaged to
innocent creditor); Henslee v. First Natl Bank, 314 SAV.2d 881 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958)(endorser not allowed to testify that his liability was conditional upon surrender of
mortgaged property to him).
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concept of conditional delivery. 00 Although Section 3-306(c) of the
Code is undoubtedly intended to cover the same ground, it is con-
siderably more elliptical and is unlikely to persuade any court to alter
its previously stated views.'07
These two sets of cases mark the outside boundaries of the parol
evidence rule problem. The surety will generally not be heard to con-
tradict completely his liability on negotiable paper voluntarily signed;
but he may testify to oral stipulations intended to condition the initill
validity of the instrument. So far, most courts are in agreement, and
the Code does not contradict the consensus at which the courts have
arrived.
Suppose, however, that the special agreement of the surety is pre-
mised on some condition not tied to the original delivery of the nego,
tiable instrument: the surety's proffered testimony relates to promises
of discharge, as where he was not to be held after partial payments by
the debtor or some third person; 08 payments were to come out of the
debtor's assets or profits; 0  the parties agreed to a date of payment
106. Section 16 of the Negotiable Instrumlents Law read:
Every contract on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery
of the instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto. As between immediate
parties, and as regards a remote party other than a holder in due course, the delivery,
in order to be effectual, must be made either by or under the authority of the party
making, drawing, accepting or indorsing, as the case may be, and in such case the
delivery may be shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and
not for the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the
instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof by all
parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively presumed. And
where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a party whose signature appears
thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary Is
proved.
The Negotiable Instruments Law has now been superseded by the Uniform Conimercial
Code in every state except Louisiana. The case law under Section 16 Is gsuintiarized inJ. BRANNAN, NEcOrIABLE INsTRUmNTS LAW 360-93 (7th ed. F. Beutel 1948); a textual exposi-
tion of the parol exidence rule under the Negotiable Instruments Law is contained in
NV. BRITTON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILS AND Noms §§ 51-55 (2d ed. 1961).
107. Section 3-306 defines the defenses available against a holder not In due course
to include, in subsection (c)
the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performarice of any condition
precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose (Section 3-408) ...
It does not in terms address itself to problems of proof.
108. See American Nat'l Bank v. Knab Co., 158 F. Supp. 695 (El), Wis. 1958) (oral
agreement that bank would look to another for payment); Wheeler v. Thomas, 828
S.W.2d 891 (rex. Civ. App. 1959) (oral agreement to cancel if obligor paid $1000 for
improvements). But cf. Little River Bank & Trust Co. v, North American Mtge. Corp. 186
So. 2d 263 (Fla. App. 1966) (oral agreement to credit this obligation with payments
made under another note admissible because not a variance).
109. See Fidelity Say. Bank v, Wormhoudt Lumber Co., 251 Iowa 1121, 104 NAW.2d 462
(1960) (note to be paid solely from profits of described business); Atlantic Bank v. Carnegie
Hall Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 301, 268 N.Y.S,2d 941 (1966) (loan to be paid off from bok
office proceeds); Consolidated Vending Co. v. Turner, 267 N.C. 576, 148 S.E.2d 531 (1960)
(note would be covered by outside payments).
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other than that stipulated in the instrument;" 0 the creditor promised
to pursue the debtor or his collateral as if the surety had merely guar-
anteed collection despite his signature as co-makern - or, in an occa-
sional reversal, the surety promised in fact to guarantee payment,
according to the creditor, even though the surety's capacity on the
instrument is that of indorser."2 In handling these cases courts are
often impressed by the fact that the testimony they are asked to con-
sider contradicts some express term of the instrument in suit, and are
reluctant to permit such overt variance.113 Other courts recognize that
admitting the defense of conditional delivery provides so penasive a
loophole that it makes little sense to exclude any conditional agree-
ments whatsoever." The Code, by treating conditional delivery as
only one of a series of defenses open against a holder not in due course
-some of which, like failure of consideration, are clearly provable by
parol evidence-seems to support the latter, minority, point of view.
If, however, Section 3-306 is read as a blanket invitation to parol
evidence, what is one to make of the various other sections of Article 3
which specifically invite oral testimony? Why should the Code include
such references in any of the provisions about indorsement or present-
ment or assignment if all of these, as agreed-upon conditions, are always
provable orally?"' The language of Section 3415 is illustrative. Sub-
110. See 'Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Gershman, 324 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1963) (oral agreement
that no suit would be brought upon due date of note); accord, Schekter v. Michael, 184
So. 2d 641 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1966) (no parol evidence to supply due date on promissory note
with blank due date, since such a note automatically a demand note; ca.e did not involve
accommodation parties).
111. See Franklin v. Sea Island Bank, III Ga. App. 182, 141 S.E.2d 121 (1965); Bakelite
Co. v. Miller, 372 S.V.2d 867 (Mo. 1963); Long Island Trust Co. v. Merz, 187 N.Y.S.2d
419 (Sup. Ct. 1959). But see Jordan v. Daniel, 94 Ga. App. 456, 95 S.E.2d 28 (1956) (not
cited in Franklin, supra); Walls v. Leadway Coop Mill, 176 So. 2d 16 (Ala. 1965); Texas
Gulf Trust Co. v. Notias, 352 S.W2d 925 (eTex. Civ. App. 1962), all allowing parol evi-
dence to vary apparent capacity.
112. Lange v. Shapiro, 68 111. App. 2d 433, 216 N.E.2d 294 (1966).
113. This point is explicitly made by Franklin Discount Co. v. Ford. 27 N.J. 473, 143
A.2d 161 (1958). There the indorser alleged that his signature wvas conditioned upon the
understanding that the creditor was going to advance a new line of credit to the debtor.
The court said that oral testimony to this effect would be admissible if the note was
silent as to its purpose, but not if it stated that its consideration was extension of time
for an existing debt owed to the creditor. A collateral issue of alteration of the note's
terms gave relevance to the court's alternative statements.
114. See, e4g., the cases allowing parol variation of capacity cited in note Ill supra.
which may be explicable on this basis. The best exposition of this view of the parol
evidence rule, on other facts, is Judge Frank's opinion in Zel v. American Seating Co.,
138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 709 (1944).
115. Some of the sections which expressly permit parol variation are extraordinarily,
perhaps inordinately, precise. For no immediately apparent reason, Section 3-119, relating
to contemporaneous writings, permits parol evidence to be introduced against the "im-
mediate obligee or any transferee" (see discussion at pp. 850-51 supra) while Section a-
403, relating to representative capacity, allows parol evidence only betveen "the imme-
diate parties."
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section (3) allows oral proof to permit the accommodation party "the
benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such.' r Unless the
words after "discharges" are discarded as superfluous, they must import
a limitation of some sort; i.e., not all discharges are accommodation
discharges, but only those which are somehow uniquely related to ac-
commodation character." 6 But the kind of defenses just considered,
namely special agreements about payment and due date and capacity,
can and do arise between any parties to negotiable paper and are not
peculiarly related to suretyship status. Furthermore, as to capacity, Sec-
tion 3-415(2) flatly states that the accommodation party "is liable in the
capacity in which he has signed," without any suggestion that parol
evidence may alter this liability. Characteristically, the comment to
Section 3-415 sheds no light on how far oral proof can go.
One resolution of the difficulty is to read Section 3-806 as the domi-
nant section, and to consider the various special sections about oral
testimony as merely illustrative of problem areas which needed specific
clarification in order to avoid confusion and doubt. Then, whenever
paper is in the hands of a holder not in due course, any party can testify
as to any special agreement. On this reading, absent a holder in due
course, the parol evidence rule no longer has any role in the construc-
tion of negotiable instruments, a result which Professor Corbin would
certainly have applauded," 7 but which would overturn a great number
of existing cases. If the draftsmen contemplated so far-reaching a re-
form, one would have expected them to reach it by a less circuitous
route.
Alternatively, and more plausibly, Section 3-306 may be taken to
describe defenses from a substantive rather than from an evidentiary
point of view. That is, if provable, the matters there listed are available
to defeat a holder not in due course, but the Section has nothing to say
about whether they are in fact provable. For the question of provabil-
ity, some other sections of the Code give guidance in specific terms;" 8
116. See pp. 865-75 infra.
117. Professor Corbin states:
Promissory notes and bills of exchange are seldom intended by the parties to be
complete integrations of the agreement in pursuance of which they are given. In
order that they may be negotiable, the face of the note must contain an uncondi-
tional promise to pay a sum of money. As against a holder in due course, proof of
extrinsic provisions and conditions has nothing to do with the "parol evidence rule."
But, as against anyone not a holder in due course, proof of such extrinsic provisions
and conditions should nearly always be permitted, as is in fact done in numberless
cases.
3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 587, at 510 (1960).
118. Of particular relevance to the surety will be the express authorization for oral
(presumably parol) proof of his accommodation character against holders not in due
course, contained in Section 3415(3). Interestingly, the subsection is not equally explicit
that parol testimony may thereafter be introduced to establish the special defenses arising
out of suretyship status, but surely such evidence should be inferentially admissible, at
least insofar as it relates to events and conduct subsequent to the creation of suretyship
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if there is no provision in Article 3, recourse must be had to the general
supplementary principles of law which continue to coexist with the
Code,119 in other words, to the pre-existing non-uniform state law. If
this is the correct reading, hopefully the result will not be more restric-
tive rules: courts should not read negative inferences into the Code's
selection of situations in which parol evidence is permitted; and Pym v.
Campbell- can furnish a common law basis for admissibility of such
evidence in the conditional delivery cases,' to fill the gap left by the
repealed Negotiable Instruments Law.
In sum, the surety who trusts to a casual agreement to insulate him-
self from unwanted liability places himself in a precarious position.
Only if he memorializes his special engagement in the form of a writing
which he can prove to be contemporaneous with the execution of the
central negotiable instrument does the Code afford him any sure pro-
tection. None of the reported cases involves a surety with that kind of
foresight, and the nature of the informal suretyship contract, born in
boundless optimism with little expectation that payment will ever be
required, is hardly consistent with this kind of formalism.
III. The Defenses of the Surety
The surety's undertaking, his basic commitment to creditor and
principal, represents the high water mark of the surety's potential lia-
status. The parol evidence rule has never been thought to bar either subsequent modifi-
cation or subsequent interpretation of performance required by the integrated contract.
3 A. CORBN, CONTRACrS §§ 574, 579 (1960). The scope of the substantive defenses encom-
passed by the "benefit of discharges dependent on [accommodation] character" is discussed
at length in the next section of this article.
119. Under Section 1-103, supplementary general principles of law are expressly re-
tained:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and
equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, prin-
cipal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bank-
ruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.
120. 6 El. S:- BI. 370 (1856), described and discussed, 3 A. CoRBIN, CournAcrs § 589
(1960).
121. In three post-Code cases, the courts relied on pre-Code case law. In Dunn v.
Orloff, 420 Pa. 492, 218 A.2d 314 (1966), the court upheld the trial court's exclusion of
proffered testimony that the creditor had agreed to return the note upon part payment
of $5000; the court invoked the Pennsylvania doctrine first laid doi.m in Gianni v. Russell
& Co., 281 Pa. 320, 126 A. 791 (1924), that an apparent integration can be upzet only by
dear and convincing evidence of fraud, accident or mistake. Two brief lower court opin-
ions in New York similarly rely on earlier New York cases to exclude parol testimony of
special exculpatory agreements about paymaent of the notes in question. Marine Midland
Trust Co. v. Couphos, 3 U.C.C. REP. SEav. 66 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1965); Delbrook Associates
v. Law, N.Y.L.J. Apr. 6, 1967, at 20, 4 U.C.C. Rrr. SE-v. 88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
In none of the three cases is there any suggestion that the courts considered the Code to
be of any relevance to the issues before them; neither Dunn nor Marine Midland
even cites the Code; Delbrook Associates refers to Section 3-415 only to establish the gen-
eral proposition that the accommodation maker of a note is primarily liable to the bolder
for value in accordance with the terms of the instrument despite the fact that considera-
tion for its delivery was paid to another party.
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bility. Other promisors may find their contractual commitments elasti-
cally construed, but the surety's contract is strictissimi juris;2 2 as a
favorite of the law, he can safely assume that implied conditions may
limit but not extend the scope of his undertaking.
A. Derivative Defenses
One possible source of limitation for the surety's contract is the
surety's ability to adopt as his own the defenses of the principal debtor
arising out of the relationship between debtor and creditor. The sure-
ty's contract is after all ancillary to that of the debtor, and it is logical
to infer that the surety's own liability should be no greater than that
of the person whom he is accommodating. By and large, suretyship law
has therefore permitted the surety to assert the defenses of his debtor,
unless the very purpose of the suretyship was to shift the risk of the
asserted defense from the creditor to the surety123 Thus the surety may
be released if the debtor's consent to the agreement was wrongfully
procured, 2 4 but the surety may continue to be liable if the debtor dis-
affirms because of his infancy, 25 or, more glaringly, because he has been
discharged in bankruptcy. 2 6
Do these suretyship principles afford a defense to a surety whose
engagement is on an Article 3 instrument? Can the surety who has
signed, say, as accommodation maker raise defenses of his co-maker, or
even of a debtor not on the instrument at all? To what extent is it rele-
vant whether suit is brought by an immediate party, or an ordinary
holder, or a holder in due course; whether the suretyship is latent or
visible; whether the defense is real or personal? To these questions,
Article 3 provides clues rather than answers, clues scattered in a variety
of sections and directed to a few specific cases rather than to the prob-
lem in general. The principal guidelines are those sections which de-
scribe defenses available against ordinary holders and against holders
in due course and, again, Section 3415, especially its general admoni-
tion that an accommodation party to a negotiable instrument is en-
titled to "the benefit of discharges dependent on his character as such."
122. See L. SIMPsoN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw or SuRETYsmIP § 29 (1950).
123, Id. §§ 52-62; 4 S. WiLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1213 (rev. cd. 1936).
124. See, e.g., Great Am. Ins. Co. v. O'Neal, 138 Kan. 617, 27 P.2d 201 (1933). But se
Ettlinger v. National Sur. Co., 221 N.Y. 467, 117 N.. 945 (1917)
125. Compare, e.g., Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82 (1873), with McKee v. Harwood Auto
Co., 204 Ind. 233, 183 N.E. 646 (1932).
126. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Willsea, 275 N.Y. 164, 9 N.E.2d 280 (1937). The
Bankruptcy Act § 57(i), 11 U.S.C. § 93(i) (1964), allows a surety to prove his caim In the
bankruptcy of the underlying obligor. See 3 W. CoamR, BANKRUP'CY 1 57.21 (14th ed.
1967).
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These defenses are not available to a latent surety against a holder in
due course, or, perhaps, to a surety who has been so improvident as to
fail to get the accommodated party on the instrument.'-
But even with these two exceptions, the basic choice to admit surety-
ship defenses as a special category for discharge is a highly significant
one. It was frequently argued and held under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law that principles of negotiability were so pervasive that sure-
tyship in negotiable form should be governed exclusively by the
ordinary rules of negotiable paper-that the surety who had elected a
negotiable commitment should be considered as no different from any
other party to a negotiable instrument. 8 The draftsmen of the Code
chose instead to emphasize and preserve suretyship principles except
where their application would prejudice innocent holders in due
course.
Under Section 3-415(3), 129 whenever negotiable paper indicates that
some signer is an accommodation party, that signer may take advantage
of suretyship defenses, even against a holder in due course. And when
the suretyship is latent, a holder who is not either himself or deriva-
tively a holder in due course is subject to two-step devaluation of his
paper, in which the accommodation party first identifies himself as such
by parol and then raises his defenses. The vulnerability of the ordinary
holder may be relatively unimportant, although the volatility of nego-
tiable paper is easily overestimated and the pre-Code case law denying
suretyship defenses regularly involved plaintiffs who were not holders
in due course. But the decision to make a bona fide holder in due
course subject to suretyship defenses of which he knows nothing other
than that a particular signer regards himself as a surety is considerably
more troublesome. This result might perhaps be avoided by a disin-
genuous refusal to draw the negative inference which the text in sub-
section (3) invites. All that the Section literally dictates is a solution for
a limited set of hypothetical cases: evidence of suretyship defenses is
inadmissible in the case of a latent surety sued by an innocent holder
127. See pp. 838-39 supra.
128. See, e.g., Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 P. 426 (1907); Union Trust Co. v.
McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912); Kratovil v. Thieda, S6 IlL. 2d 247, 222 NM.d
485 (1966). All these cases involved interpretation of the discharge sections of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law which contained no relevant provision for the discharge of those
who, as makers, were primarily liable. See N.I.L, §§ 119, 120.
129. Section 3-415() reads: '
As against a holder in due course and without notice of the accommodation oral proof
of the accommodation is not admissible to give the accommodation party the benefit
of discharges dependent on his character as such. In other cases the accommodation
character may be shown by oral proof.
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in due course; evidence of suretyship defenses is admissible to protect
any surety sued by a holder not in due course, directly if the accom-
modation status is visible, or otherwise after its oral establishment.
Arguably, the subsection means only that ordinary holders, but never
holders in due course, will be vulnerable to suretyship defenses. Com-
ment 1 goes no further than, and is thus consistent with, this construc-
tion; 30 but it does not in any other way rebut the more obvious inter-
pretation of the text, which would extend vulnerability to all those
who deal with negotiable paper bearing visible sureties. If the subsec-
tion is given its natural reading, purchasers of negotiable paper who
think the instruments they are buying are made more valuable by the
presence of a surety may well be sorely disappointed; instead, visible
suretyship may, under the Code, be a warning signaling unknown and
uncertain defenses hovering around the liability of the surety-may in
fact portend substantial impediments to speedy liquidation of the nego-
tiable paper upon its maturity.
It is noteworthy in passing that the shifting of these unknown risks
to a holder in due course is inconsistent with the pattern followed else-
where in Article 3. Typically, the various sources of discharge listed in
Section 3-601 (which, interestingly, has no cross-reference to Section
3-415)131 are personal defenses only, ineffective against subsequent in-
nocent due course holders. 132 Similarly, restrictive indorsements have
130. All that Comment 1 has on this point is:
The subsection recognizes the defenses of a surety in accordance with the provisions
subjecting one not a holder in due course to all simple contract defenses, as well ashis rights against his principal after payment.
131. Section 3-601, the opening section of Part 6, Discharge, reads as follows:(1) The extent of the discharge of any party from liability on an instrument Is gov-
erned by the sections on(a) payment or satisfaction (Section 3-603); or(b) tender of payment (Section 3-604); or(c) cancellation or renunciation (Section 3-605): or
(d) impairment of right of recourse or of collateral (Section 3.606); or
(e) reacquisition of the instrument by a prior party (Section 3-208): or
(f) fraudulent and material alteration (Section 3-407); or(g) certification of a check (Section 3-411); or
(h) acceptance varying a draft (Section 3-412); or(i) unexcused delay in presentment or notice of dishonor or protest (Section 8.502).
(2) Any party is also discharged from his liability on an instrument to another party
by any other act or agreement with such party which would discharge his simple
contract for the payment of money.
(3) The liability of all parties is discharged when any party who has himself no
right of action or recourse on the instrument
(a) reacquires the instrument in his own right; or(b) is discharged under any provision of this Article, except as otherwise provided
with respect to discharge for impairment of recourse or of collateral (Section
3-606).
132. Section 3-602 provides, without qualification:
No discharge of any party provided by this Article is effective against a subsequent
holder in due course unless he has notice thereof when he takes the instrument.
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only a very limited effect on remote and innocent takers.m And, as
noted above, collateral writings affecting the negotiable instrument do
not bind holders in due course without actual knowledge of their
contents.134 It is hard to discern a reason of policy for treating the
suretyship defense case so differently.
But if the effect of Section 3-415 is not totally avoidable as to holders
in due course, perhaps it can at least be minimized. For what kinds of
circumstances and what sorts of defenses is the Section appropriate?
What are the "discharges dependent upon his (the surety's) character?"
The simplest cases to dispose of are those that relate to merely per-
sonal defenses, classically failure of consideration and fraudulent in-
ducement. The cases say repeatedly that conduct of the creditor which
totally defeats any possible liability by the principal debtor gives equal
immunity to the surety. 3r But the surety's defense can be viewed either
as an adoption of that of his debtor, or as an injury to the surety him-
self resulting from a material alteration of the conditions for which he
has bargained. The creditor's conduct has substantially increased the
chances of the principal debtor's non-performance and hence materially
altered the risk that the surety was prepared to underwrite.2:1 Viewed
as the debtor's defense, the surety's claim runs against the current of
modern law, which is opposed to the assertion of a ius teriii even as
against ordinary holders. 37 Viewed however as a non-performance of a
condition precedent-as the surety's own defense-it is a perfectly
familiar personal defense, available against all who do not qualify as
holders in due course. 38 None of the cases which purport to lay down
suretyship law goes any further, 39 and they should not be gratuitously
extended to implicate holders in due course.
133. See Sections 3-206, 3-304(2), 3-603(1)(b).
134. See Section 3-119, discussed pp. 850-51 supra.
135. In addition to the cases on total failure of consideration, cited note 84 supra,
there are cases of partial failure of consideration, such as Shakro v. Haddad, 149 Conn.
160, 177 A.2d 221 (1961) and Broad Wall Corp. v. O'Connor, 37 Misc. 2d 408, 238
N.Y.S.2d 342, (Sup. Ct. 1962), in which the liability of the surety is scaled down to that of
the underlying obligor.
136. Compare RrsrATESIENT OF SEcuKtpY § 118, Comment to Subsection (1) with id.
§ 126, Comment a (1941).
137. Under Section 5-306(d), daims of third persons are generally unavailable even
against holders not in due course. For a discussion of the problem in general terms, see
IV. BRrroN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES §§ 157-60 (2d ed. 1961).
138. Under Section 3-306(c)
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the instrument
subject to
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, nonperformance of any condition
precedent ....
139. None of the cases raising this type of defense involves holders in due course.
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This analysis is equally appropriate to the principal debtor's real
defenses. The principal debtor may have no liability because his signa-
ture was forged, or ultra vires, or the product of infancy or some other
form of incapacity or illegality.140 In most cases, these events constitute
an alteration of the surety's contemplated risk,141 and hence a change of
conditions and a personal defense. l3ut unless the surety himself was
coerced or acting ultra vires, as to him the transaction is merely void-
able, not void ab initio. Again, the relevant suretyship cases and
treatises which protect the surety do so only in litigation involving
ordinary holders. The few cases involving the forged signatures of
co-makers to negotiable instruments have uniformly allowed holders
in due course to recover from those whose signatures were genuine.'42
Except for the heinousness of the creditor's fraud, there is no more
reason to prefer the surety over the due course holder here than in
other instances of fraudulent inducement. As between a surety cen-
trally involved in the initial negotiations and a remote and innocent
holder in due course, there can be no doubt as to which has easier ac-
cess to relevant information or readier channels for self-protection.
The mere giving of notice of suretyship should not suffice to shift the
risk of these inquiries from surety to due course holder.
43
140. See, e.g., Bologna Bros. v. Morrissey, 154 So, 2d 455 (La, App. 1963), holding that
a surety could raise the defense that a contract for the sale of liquor was illegal as to the
obligor and therefore also illegal as to the surety himself.
141. For an eitample of risk-assumption by the surety, see the cascg under the Call.
fornia antidefidency statutes which, although they protect the underlying debtor from a
deficiency judgment, have been held to provide no defense to the accommodating en-
dorser, See, e.g., Engelman v. Gordon, 242 Cal. App. 2d 510, 51 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1966);
Heckes v. Sapp, 229 Cal. App. 2d 549, 40 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1964); Stephenson v. Lawn, 155
Cal. App. 2d 669, 318 P.2d 182 (1957). The California statutes and their relevance to a
surety are discussed in Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A Newjudicial Approach, 51 CA~n'. L. REv. 1, 23-28 (1963).
142. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Archer, 113 Ind. 865, 14 N.E. 543 (1887); Wheeler v. Traders
Deposit Bank, 107 Ky. 653, 55 S.AV. 552 (1900); Morris Plan Co. v. Adler, 126 Misc. 257,
213 N.Y.S. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (under the NJ.L.). The most important Uniform Cominer-
cial Code case to date involved a co-maker contesting her liability to the immediate payee,
an ordinary holder. Although she was allowed to demonstrate her accommodation status,
she failed to establish her substantive complaint that the transaction was usurious. Under
Pennsylvania law, the defense of usury is not available to a corporate borrower, despite
the fact that the co-maker was an individual, the court held that, as accommodator, she
could not raise a defense which her principal, a corporation, could not pursue. Implicit
in the court's holding is the conclusion that if the transaction had been usurious as to
the principal obligor, that finding would have furnished a defense to the accommodation
party as well. The cdurt does not address itself at all to the holder in due course prob.
1em. Raby v. Commercial Banking Corp., 208 Pa. Super. 52, 220 A.2d 659 (1066). taby
has recently been followed, under similar circumstances, in New Jersey, A. J. Armstrong
Co. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 97 NJ. Super. 246, 234 A.2d 737 (1967).
143. Describing the requisites of a holder in due course, the Code in Section 3-302(l)(c)
requires that he be without notice. Section 3-304 spells out what constitutes notice to a
purchaser. Section 3-304(4) indicates:
Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice of a
defense or claim
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In sum, the surety who signs a negotiable instrument should be held
to the same basic standards as are other signatories of such paper. The
surety may justifiably complain that alterations in the debtor-creditor
relationship so materially affect his contemplated commitment as to
avoid his own obligation, and that any defenses of the principal debtor
to which he has not expressly or impliedly agreed involve such altera-
tion. But suretyship law should not be read to require that this legiti-
mate complaint of the surety be differentiated from other legitimate
personal defenses of other parties to negotiable instruments. The surety
may limit his liability by reference to defenses of the principal debtor
only when he is sued by an ordinary holder, not in an action by a
holder in due course.144 Such a resolution is a reasonable compromise
(c) that any party has signed for accommodation ....
While this may be merely a restatement of the basic proposition that suretyship status
per se is no defense, it is just as plausibly a policy choice of the type suggested. The
difficulty in implementing this broader reading is that Section 3-304 may be superseded
by the specific provisions of Section 3-415(3), if that subsection is read to apply to holders
in due course. That is, Section 3-304(4)(c) at best says only that visible surt)ship is not
in and of itself inconsistent with due course holding, but Section 3-415(3) arguably sub-
jects even due course holders to certain defenses.
144. Support for this position can be found in the analogous situation arising out of
material alteration or incorrect completion of the face of a negotiable instrument. The
Code deals with this problem in Section 3-407:(I) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes the contract of any
party thereto in any respect, including any such change In
(a) the number or relations of the parties; or
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized; or
(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of it.
(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due course(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and material discharges any
party whose contract is thereby changed unless that party assents or j5 pre-
cluded from asserting the defense;
(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the instrument may be enforced
according to its original tenor, or as to incomplete instruments according to
the authority given.
(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce the instrument accord-
ing to its original tenor, and, when an incomplete instrument has been completed.
he may enforce it as completed.
Under Section 3-304, a purchaser who would otherwise qualify as a holder in due course
is not easily deemed to have notice of alteration or improper completion. Subsection (I)
provides:
The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery or alter-
ation, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its validity, terms or
ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay....
Subsection (4) adds:
Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the purchaser notice of a
defense or claim
(d) that any incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the purchaser has
notice of any improper completion....
In these examples of variations from original expectations, the Code is solicitous of the
rights of the due course holder, but not of ordinary holders; in the case of incorrect com-
pletion, the due course holder can fully enforce the writing as he found it. There is in
the suretyship context no easy compromise solution comparable to the enforcement of
the materially altered instrument according to its original tenor.
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of the potentially adverse claims of the laws of negotiability and of
suretyship. It looks to suretyship for a source of implied conditions to
the surety's liability, and to negotiability for guidance as to the circum-
stances under which these implied conditions are to be operative. So
limited a reading of the "discharge" language, although not an intui-
tively obvious interpretation of Section 3-415, has merits of over-all
plausibility and workability which the surface reading does not.
B. Direct Defenses
There are, of course, numerous causes for complaint under the law of
suretyship which are not tied to infirmities in the negotiation of the
original debtor-creditor contract. Does Section 3-415 contemplate that
any visible surety be entitled at least to these defenses against all comers
as a matter of right?
Three types of potential defenses will suffice to raise the issues. The
surety has classically been permitted to assert as a defense the creditor's
discharge of the principal debtor, since such a discharge fundamentally
undercuts the surety's right to reimbursement 45 In a frequently liti-
gated subclass of this type of defense, the creditor grants a binding ex-
tension of credit to the debtor, thereby temporarily frustrating the
surety's opportunity for liquidating the transaction. 14 A second type
of defense arises out of the creditor's mishandling of collateral deposi-
ted with the creditor for the greater security of all of those who may
have a stake in the transaction, including, by way of subrogation, the
surety.147 A third type of defense, available in a substantial minority
of states, permits the surety to avoid liability if he has effectively com-
municated to the creditor an urgent and unheeded request for imme-
diate pursuit of the debtor. 48
All of these defenses raise the same general complaint: unreasonable
and unauthorized alteration of the risks contemplated by the surety-
ship commitment. In the suretyship law they all typically appear in
cases of direct dealings, involving one debtor, one creditor and one
surety. When these cases arise in the context of a negotiable instru-
ment, there are at least two additional complicating factors. One in-
volves an assessment of the risk allocation inherent in the choice of a
145. See L. SIMPsoN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SuRETYSHIP §§ 63-71, at 296-328 (1950).
146. Id. § 73, at 351.
147. Id. §§ 74-76, at 370-89.
148. Id. §§ 42, 43; Comment, The Doctrine of Pain v. Packard, 37 YAE L.J. 971 (1928).
In those states in which the doctrine is statutory, it apparently survives enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code. For example, CAL. Civ. CODE § 2845 (West 1957) was not
repealed when the Code was enacted.
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negotiable form of commitment, discussed above. 40 As to this, the
Code has chosen to abandon conclusive presumptions attributing
greater risk-assumption to accommodation co-makers than to accom-
modation indorsers.1 50 But negotiability also invites negotiation, with
the possibility that the surety may complain of nefarious conduct by
any of a number of possible predecessors of the holder now seeking to
enforce the instrument.
Are these defenses, long cherished by sureties as central to their
undertaking, the core of substance to which Section 3-415 addresses
itself? Do they represent those sources of discharge so inherent in the
nature of accommodation character that they are to be specially treated?
If so, how?
Again, the ultimate testing ground of the impact of the Section must
be the case of the holder who is a holder in due course and whose only
warning of suretyship defenses arises out of the identification of one of
the parties to the instrument as a surety. The ordinary holder, subject
even to conditions which only derivatively impair the surety's secu-
rity, 51 is certainly subject to those which directly alter the latter's
149. See pp. 863-65 supra.
150. Article 's concern to protect the surety's right to reimbursement is evidenced
not only by the preservation of these defenses of suretyship law, which look peculiarly
to potential impairment of recourse, but also by Section 3-415(5)'s express proviion that
the paying surety has a right to sue the party accommodated "on the instrument," with
the attendant advantages of favorable presumptions to ease proof and recovery. See Sec-
tion 3-507. Subsection (5) thus resolves a conflict of the pre-Code law illustrated by Mll
v. Gleason, 92 Kan. 754, 142 P. 287 (1914), and Quimby v. Varnum, 190 Mass. 211, 76N.E. 671 (1906); see IV. BRrrroN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILIS AND NOTES § 297 (2d
ed. 1961). When the surety sues the underlying obligor, he is exercising both the right to
reimbursement, to which the surety is entitled by virtue of his own status, and the cred-
itor's right to collect, to which he is subrogated by virtue of paying the creditor. See
L. Srs'WSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF SUTm-YSHmP §§ 47, 48 (1950). Occasionally, reliance
on these alternate theories may lead to differences in monetary claims, as when the surety
pays off the creditor at a discount: since the creditor could have sued the obligor for the
face value of the instrument, the paying accommodator could argue that, subrogated to
this claim, he too can hold the obligor to the terms of the instrument; on a reimburse-
ment theory, he would be entitled only to be made whole for the cost of his payment.
Although the wording of subsection (5) lends support to the subrogation theory, it is not
necessary to read the right to sue "on the instrument" as a right to collect the face value
of the instrument. Pre-Code law, with few exceptions, allowed the surety no greater re-
covery than that to which reimbursement would entitle him; it considered subrogation
an aid to enforcement of reimbursement rights rather than a totally alternative substan-
tive remedy. See 4 S. WILEMSTON, CoNTRACrs § 1285 (rev. ed. 1936). The principal case to
the contrary, Fowler v. Strickland, 107 Mass. 552 (1871), was disowned in its own jurisdic-
tion in Merchants Discount Co. v. Federal St. Corp., 300 Mass. 167, 14 N.E.2d 155 (1938).
Section 3-415(5) cannot have been intended to revive the discredited Fowler case and
should not be so interpreted.
151. Article 3 contains another section which apparently limits the rights of holders
in due course against visible sureties. The section describing the v.-ranty liability of
indorsers of negotiable paper is carefully drafted to exclude the accommodating indorser:
under Section 3-417(2), only a person who "transfers an instrument and receives consid-
eration" makes warranties. It is doubtful whether this section is effective, against a
holder in due course, when the surety's indorsement gives no warning of accommodation
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commitment.15 2 At the other extreme, the innocent holder in due
course has no responsibilities to the entirely latent surety. 5 3 However,
even the holder in due course who belatedly, after acquisition, dis-
covers the true character of one of the signatories must thereafter treat
paper and collateral with the caution that Section 3-606 commands.154
That Section is dear that the holder who knows of rights of recourse
may not himself release or agree not to sue the underlying debtor, nor
may he impair any collateral against which a right of recourse might
be exercised. But Section 8-606, particularly when read with the sur-
rounding sections, is equally clear that the discharge which results from
violation of its mandates is only effective between the parties imme-
diately affected, is only a personal defense, and is not an answer to a
suit by a subsequent and innocent holder in due course.'
status, i.e., in the absence of irregularity of position (ef. Section 3-315(4)) or explicit legend
of guaranty. Sued by an innocent holder in due course, the surety is likely to find his
exclusion demoted to a mere personal defense, and hence unavailable, Such warranty
liability may be important in the event of discharge of the indorsement engagement by,
for example, unexcused delay in presentment; delays in presentment discharge the in-
dorsement engagement of all accommodation indorsers who do not waive these formal
conditions expressly or through a contract of guaranty. See Section 3-416(5). The design
of Section 3-417(2) was, however, to interdict rather than to preserve the alternative of
warranty liability under suretyship circumstances. If the design cannot be totally effec.
tuated, it is at least likely to be invoked to protect the surety who has taken painz to
make himself visible; the visible suretyship is in effect a disclaimer of warranty. Dis-
claimers do not interfere with holder m due course status: it is possible to be such a
holder in the face of an indorsement "without recourse" or an indorsement warning of
accommodation (see Section 3-304(4)(c)), But even the holder in due course cannot pursue
the qualified indorser as if he were unqualified, or the visible surety as if he were a
negotiating indorser.
152. See Section 3-306(c) and pp. 865-67 supra.
153. These defenses, dependent upon suretyship status and arising directly out of
suretyship law, are, on the one hand, a direct source of discharge against an ordinary
holder, under Section 3-415(3), and, on the other hand, represent implied conditlons of
the suretyship undertaking under Section 3-306(c). Either way, one who is not a holder
in due course cannot avoid them.
154. The question of what makes a surety visible is one on which Sections 8-415 and
3-606 do not entirely track. Under Section 3-415(4), "an indorsement which shows that It
is not in the chain of title is notice of its accommodation character"; and under Section
3-415(3) a holder is tested as to his "notice of the accommodation," But Section 3-606(l)(a)
speaks of the holder's "knowledge" of rights of recourse, while Section 3-606(il)(b) dis.
charges anyone who "has" a right of recourse. Presumably the knowledge criterion of
Section 3-606(l)(a) should be imported into (1)(b) so that the entirely latent surety can-
not suddenly claim discharge from impairment of collateral; this result might also be
achieved by a purposive reading of what impairment is "unjustifiable." But "knowledge"
is a less expansive qualification than "notice" under Section 1-201(25). It is therefore pos-
sible that the irregular indorser has accommodation status under Section 3-415 but Is
not necessarily, in the absence of actual knowledge, known to have rights of recourse
under Section 3-606. This is not, I think, the better reading of Section 3.606, but the
unfortunate use of similar but not identical language in the two sections makes a
literal and narrow reading of Section 3-606 possible.
155. Section 3-606 reads as follows:
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that without such
party's consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue any person
against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a right of recours
870
Suretyship Under Article 3 of UCG
If Section 3-415(3) subjects a non-participating holder in due course
to those defenses merely because he knows that one of the parties is a
surety, it will of course substantially depreciate the value of instru-
ments bearing such a notation.1e 0 On the other hand, suretyship is a
commercially desirable institution of a type which the Code is dearly
designed to support, and its risks ought not casually to be underesti-
mated or extended. And insofar as the mishandling of negotiable paper
or collateral occurs while the instrument is in the hands of an inter-
mediate holder, neither surety nor ultimate holder has special access
to controls which might avoid the events which give rise to these
defenses.
It is of course true that during the 50 years in which the Negotiable
Instruments Law was in force, suretyship managed to survive despite
or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such person the instrument
or collateral or otherwise discharges such person, except that failure or delayin effecting any required presentment, protest or notice of dishonor with re-
spect to any such person does not discharge any party as to whom pressentment,
protest or notice of dishonor is effective or unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf
of the party or any person against whom he has a right of recourse.
(2) By express reservation of rights against a party with a right of recourse the holder
preserves
(a) all his rights against such party as of the time when the instrument vwas orig-
inally due; and
(b) the right of the party to pay the instrument as of that time; and
(c) all rights of such party to recourse against others.
The Section is noteworthy in several respects. First, it extends its protection to all those
known to have a right of recourse, regardless of their capacity on the instrument or
whether they are signatories to the instrument at all. Second, the Section may be avoided
by the consent of those who have a right of recourse, a qualification vhich has been
broadly interpreted in London Leasing Corp. v. Interfina, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 657, 279
N.YS.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1967), and A.J. Armstrong, Inc. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 97
N.J. Super. 246, 234 A.2d. 737 (1967), to cover those who participate in renegotiation of
a debt whose payment they have guaranteed. But Section 3-118(f) construes narrowly the
standard consent dause often contained in the negotiable instrument itself. Third, an
alternative avoidance technique, except for the impairment of collateral, is the reserva-
tion of rights against an accommodating party. Fourth, the discharge which the Section
provides is not necessarily a total discharge but may be only pro tanto. This makes emi-
nently good sense in the case of impairment of collateral, in which the surety has tradl-
tionally been protected only to the extent of the security wrongfully released. See L.
SiMPsoN, HADBooK ON Tm LAw OF SumnrvHn, § 74 (1950). But when the surety com-
plains of wrongful release of his debtor, or extension of time for payment, to what ex-
tent is the surety then discharged? Under the general law of suretyship, absent consent or
reservation of rights, all sureties were totally discharged by release of the underlying
obligor, and uncompensated sureties were equally released by extensions; compensated
sureties were released in the latter case only to the extent that they could chow injury.
Id. §§ 63, 73. If all those who have a right of recourse must now demonstrate the extent
to which their reimbursement rights have been impaired, Section 8-606 will be l= uzeful
to them than has generally been thought.
156. Section 3-601 lists Section 3-606 as one of the sources of discharge, in subsection(1)(d); Section 3-602 then goes on to provide flatly:
No discharge of any party provided by this Article is effective against a subsequent
holder in due course unless he has notice thereof when he takes the instrument.
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fewer defenses than were available during the 19th Century,157 or than
the Code now promises to guarantee. Furthermore, in practice those
defenses which were available to secondary parties under the Negotia-
ble Instruments Law were not, as far as is readily discoverable, asserted
against later due course holders. 58 Reflection about the operation of
these defenses suggests why this confrontation would not readily have
arisen. The only suretyship defenses expressly recognized under the
Negotiable Instruments Law were those relating to discharge or delay
157. For many years, there was recurrent debate, particularly in academic circles, about
the Negotiable Instrument Law's apparent failure to allow suretyship defenses of an)
kind to accommodation makers. This gap in the Negotiable Instruments Law was dis.
covered by Dean Ames in his initial commentary on the then newly promulated statute
(in whose drafting he had not been invited to participate). Ames, The Negotiable Instru.
ments Law, 14 HARv.'L. REv. 241, 255 (1900). Dean Ames' article was the opening salvo
in what came to be known as the Ames-Brewster controversy, Brewster, as President of
the National Conference on Uniform Laws, undertaking with a certain amount of acer-
bity to defend the Negotiable Instruments Law. See Brewster, A Defense of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84 (1901); Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law. A
Word More, 14 HAgv, L. Rv. 442 (1901); Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law-A
Rejoinder to Dean Ames, 15 HARD. L. Rv. 26 (1901); McKeehan, The Negotiable Instru.
ments Law (A Review of the Ames-Brewster Controversy), 50 Am. L. Rnv. 437, 499, 561
(1902); Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law-Necessary Amendments, 16 HARv. L.
Rnv. 255 (1903). The early case law almost uniformly read this gap as an intentional
omission denying the surety his traditional defenses if he signed a negotiable instrument
in the capacity of maker (or acceptor). See, e.g., Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 P.
426 (1907); Vanderford v. Farmers & Mechanics' Natl Bank, 105 Md. 164, 66 A. 47 (1907);
Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679 (1912), all involving known sure-
ties precluded from defense against ordinary holders not in due course.
In the late 1920's, there was renewed interest in amendment of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law to reverse this result. See Turner, Revision of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, .8 YA.E L.J. 25, 48-49 (1928); Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed
Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law, 38 YALE L.J. 1047, 1056-58 (1929). No
official amendments were ever promulgated on this issue.
The case law under the Negotiable Instruments Law came to be more divided than
the earliest interpretations had indicated, but the majority of cases read the Negotiable
Instruments Law strictly, literally, and exclusively, to deny the surety-maker at least the
defense of unconsented extensions of time. The cases are collectcd in J. BRANNAN, NtrO-
TIABLE INMsRUMENTs LAw 1120-33 (7th ed. F. Beutel 1948); W. BluTroN, HANDBOOK OF Tilt:
LAw OF BU.Is AND Noms § 301 (2d ed. 1961), and discussed in an excellent article, Hilpert,
Discharge of Latent Sureties on Negotiable Instruments Because of Release or Extension
of Time, 50 YALE L.J. 387 (1941). Recent examples of cases denying accommodation makers
suretyship defenses include United States v. Birngold Realty Co., 211 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), aff"d sub nom. United States v. Schildhaus, 316 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1963) (per curlam);
Kratovil v. Thieda, 36 Ill. 2d 247, 222 N.E.2d 485 (1966); Rose v. Homsey, 347 Mass. 259,
197 N.E.2d 603 (1964); James Employment Credit Union v. Hawley, 2 Wis. 2d 490, 87
N.W.2d 299 (1958); these are all extension cases, except for the Massachusetts case alleg.
ing impairment of collateral.
The Kratovil case is worthy of special mention, because it was decided under unusually
provocative circumstances. The case arose pre-Code, and thus the surety could not claim
the protection which the Code, enacted at the time of decision, would have afforded him.
But there were no Illinois cases on this issue under the Negotiable Instruments Law, and
the 19th Century Illinois case law was consistent with the Code result. Nonetheless, Jus.
tice Schaefer for a unanimous court chose to abide by the majority construction of the
Negotiable Instruments Law, even though he acknowledged that the decisions under that
statute "have not been uniform, either in result or in approach." 36 111. 2d at 2,19, 222
N.E.2d at 486.
158. Research uncovered no case in which a holder in due course was met with this
kind of defense.
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of the obligation of the principal debtor.110 But no holder could effec-
tively alter the debtor's obligation 10 without marking the instrument
in some way which would make it difficult for a subsequent taker to
be without notice.' 6 '
The same practical considerations limit the scope of the problem
under the Code. Releases or agreements not to sue would not protect
the debtor against later holders unless the later holder had notice of
such limitations when he took the instrument;ea presumably, such
agreements dehors the instrument would therefore be deemed to be
mere forebearances and not binding releases. If the instrument re-
flected the debtor's partial or total discharge, a purchaser would have
notice of "any defense against it" and could therefore not qualify as a
holder in due course. 163 Failure to pursue the debtor after an appro-
priate request by the surety can only discharge the surety after the
debtor's obligation is due and owing, and hence can arise only on an
159. Under Section 120 of the Negotiable Instruments Law:
A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged:
(5) By a release of the principal debtor, unless the holder's right of recoure against
the party secondarily liable is expressly reserved;(6) By any agreement binding upon the holder to extend the time of payment, or to
postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument, unless made with the assent
of the party secondarily liable, or unless the right of recourse against such party
is expressly reserved.
160. Understandably, a good deal of the case law about extensions and releases re-
volves about the issue of whether or not any effective alteration of the underl)ing indebt-
edness was ever consummated. A number of cases have held, for example, that the mere
fact that the creditor/holder participates in a bankruptcy or receivership proceeding or
in a composition agreement does not mean that he has released anyone. See, e.g., Lamothe
& Young, Inc. v. Vehs, 148 Conn. 115, 167 A.2d 709 (1961); Hecknan v. National Bank,
201 A.2d 688 (D.C. Mun. App. 1964); F.D. Cline Paving Co. v. Southland Speedways, Inc.,
250 N.C. 358, 108 S.E2d 641 (1959). Nor is the execution of a new note widthout the
surety necessarily conclusive about the continuing validity of the old note retained by
the creditor/holder. Compare Polk Chevrolet, Inc. v. Vicaro, 162 So. 2d 761 (La. App.
1964) (not a release) with Card v. Commercial Bank, 119 So. 2d 404 (Fla. App. 1960)(a
binding extension of time, so indorser discharged). Of course, if only the new note were
negotiated to a subsequent holder, he could not sue the surety who was not a party to
that instrument. If the original note were so negotiated, a case not illustrated by any
recent reported litigation, any indication of change in due date would be a visible altera-
tion of the instrument sufficient in itself to avoid it, under Section 124 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, as to non-consenting parties; such a negotiation without a marking of
the instrument would indicate that no release or time extension, except as a matter of
grace, had been intended.
161. See Negotiable Instruments Law §§ 52(4), 56.
162. Under Section 3-602:
No discharge of any party provided by this Article is effective against a subsequent
holder in due course unless he has notice thereof when he takes the instrument.
163. Section 3-302(1)(c) requires a holder in due course to be without notice of "any
defense against or claim to" the instrument. Under Section 3-204(l)(a), any visible altera-
tion constitutes notice of a claim or defense if it calls into question the instrument's
validity, terms or ownership; certainly the validity of the altered instrument against a
nonconsenting party is a matter of substantial doubt under Section 3-407. What happans
if an alteration is accompanied by a reservation of rights authorized by Section 3-606(1)(a)
is not dear. The only Code case finding an effective reservation of rights does not spll
out how this was accomplished; nor does it involve a subsequent negotiation. Priggen
Steel Buildings Co. v. Parsons, 350 Mass. 62, 213 N.E.2d 252 (1966).
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instrument which is overdue;0 4 such an instrument cannot be taken
in due course except in the rare instances in which the instrument's
maturity is ambiguous.100
However, not all the potential difficulties vanish so readily upon in-
spection. In particular, the defense of improper handling of collateral
security is a peculiarly sensitive point of conflict. Dissipation of col-
lateral is hardly ever likely to be a fact of which a later holder would
have notice when he buys a negotiable instrument. Yet loss of such
security is both difficult for the surety to foresee or to prevent and
inherently prejudicial when it occurs.
How, then, is this conflict to be resolved? One solution would be to
read Section 3415's "discharges dependent on his character" as a closed-
end reference to Section 3-606. In other words, Section 3-415 could be
simply a general account of the relationship between accommodation
status and negotiable instruments, providing some guidance on prob-
lems of formation, recourse, and proof, and also a reminder that special
defenses may be appropriate under undefined circumstances. For de-
fenses in general, then, one would look to what excuses are appropriate
against ordinary holders and holders in due course; for sources of dis-
charge, one would look to the specific discharge provisions of Part 6.
The official cross references do in fact include a citation to Section
3-606. Under that Section, the holder with an instrument bearing a
visible surety would be disabled from himself prejudicing the surety,
but would have no further duty of inquiry about prior dissipation of
collateral of which he was innocent.
There are several reasons why such a solution is appealing. First, it
gives content to what is otherwise an entirely unguided reference to
suretyship law-a reference the more frustrating since suretyship law
will not provide answers for negotiable instruments cases, which care-
ful textwriters typically set aside as a special and unconsidered case,160
To extrapolate from suretyship law the rights of holders in due course
versus accommodation parties is to reason from that which does not
exist. Furthermore, a closed-end reference to other parts of the Code
164. The doctrine of Pain v. Packard is usually put in terms of compelling the cred-
itor to collect from the principal debtor after that debtor's default. See L. SIMPSON, HAND.
BOOK ON THE LAW OF SURBETsHiP § 42, at 178-79 (1950). In any case, no possibility of
pursuit could arise before maturity of the underlying instrument.
165. Under Section 3-302(1)(c), a holder who otherwise qualifies for due course status
is foreclosed not by the fact that he purchased an overdue instrument, but only by his
purchase with notice that the instrument is so outdated. Section 3-304(3) elaborates on
what constitutes notice that an instrument is overdue, The most obvious example of am.
biguity arises out of exercise of an optional acceleration clause.
166. See, e.g., RESATEAMENT OF SECURITY §§ 127, 129 (1941); L. SIMPSON, HANDII00' ON
nm LAw OF SuaLrvsnp § 16 (1950).
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would be conducive to the development of the uniform standards and
practices which a Uniform Code should foster.107 Finally, what general
suretyship law there is on the creditor's disposition of collateral indi-
cates that this is a defense of the surety which the courts have seen fit
to define narrowly, to limit rather than to expand. Most courts view
the creditor's access to collateral and surety as two entirely distinct
assets, for each of which the creditor is deemed to have bargained, and
to each of which he is entitled with a minimum of fuss and bother and
judicial second-guessing. For example, California courts have recently
refused to extend the benefits of anti-deficiency statutes to sureties,ltu
and a Florida court has refused to compel a creditor bank to exercise
its rights of lien and setoff on behalf of a surety.' c9 Other courts have
been similarly unimpressed by the surety's complaint that the creditor
should have recorded his collateral interest'70 or enforced it speedily.'
Of course, the narrowness of the impairment of collateral defense
can also be turned the other way, to support a literal reading of Section
167. A dosed-end reference has, of course, implications other than third.party conse-
quences. It means that the only bases for discharge because of accommodation status are
those listed in Section 5-606: releases, extensions, impairment of collateral. It means that
other defenses are not covered: the derivative defenses just discussed in text, as well as
direct defenses such as the doctrine of Pain v. Padcard, discharging a surety if a creditor
neglects to pursue the underlying obligor: Pain v. Padiard, in that minority of states In
which it prevails, has from time to time been successfully invoked by signatories of nego-
tiable instruments. See Comment, The Doctrine of Pain v. Packard, 37 YA L.J. 971, 975
(1928). Exclusion of these suretyship defenses from Section 3-415 need not however signal
their total unavailability; although demoted from the category of discharge, they may
survive as personal defenses, for breach of implied condition, under Section 3-06(c), to
defeat claims of holders not in due course. A closed-end reference would impose national
uniformity on discharges, affecting holders in due course, while allowing local option to
prevail on what suretyship defenses bind ordinary holders.
168. See, e.g., Engelman v. Gordon, 242 Cal. App. 2d 510, 51 Cal. Rptr. 627 (196);
Heckes v. Sapp, 229 Cal. App. 2d 549, 40 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1964); Stephenson v. Lawn, 155
Cal. App. 2d 669, 818 P.2d 152 (1957); and Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in
California-A New Judicial Approach, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 23-28 (1953).
169. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Meltzer, 145 So. 2d 766 (Fla. App. 1962). See also
Bank of Hawaii v. Char, 43 Hawaii 17 (1958); Smith v. First Pasadena State Bank, 401
S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
170. See Rose v. Homsey, 847 Mass. 259, 197 N.E2d 603 (1954); cf. United States v.
Vince, 270 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. La. 1967); Nation Wide, Inc. v. Scullin, 256 F. Supp. 929
(D.N.J. 1966) (both non-negotiable guaranty cases).
171. Sureties have not been discharged by the creditor's delay in foreclosing, see United
States v. Helena Office Supply Co., 256 F. Supp. 53 (D. Mont. 196; Fidelity Sa. Bank Y.
JWormhoudt Lumber Co., 251 Iowa 1121, 104 NAV.2d 462 (1960); in repossessing. see
First Natl Bank v. G.R. Wood, Inc., 89 N.J. Super. 577, 215 A.2d 784 (1965); or in
liquidating collateral, see House of Loans, Inc. v. Matassa Motor Co.. 115 So. 2d 210
(La. App. 1959). On the other hand, if the creditor's handing of the collateral so violates
statutory deficiency and resale procedures as to discharge the underl)ing debtor, and
hence to impair the surety's right to reimbursement, the surety may get off. Manufac-
turers Hanover Trust Co. v. Goldstein, 25 App. Div. 2d 405, 270 N.YS.2d 261 (Sup. Ct.
1966); Economy Say. Loan Co. v. Weir, 105 Ohio App. 531, 6 Ohio Op. 2d 254, 153
N.E.2d 155 (1957). Suprisingly, some recent cases have required greater circumspection
about insurance of collateral. In Woodruff Motors, Inc V. Commercial Credit Corp.,
123 Vt. 404, 190 A.2d 705 (1963), indorsers were allowed to use defensively the creditor's
failure to notify them of insurance cancellation; and in United States v. Fyles, 253 F.
Supp. 586 (D. Vt. 1965), the court went even further to suggest circumstances under
which the creditor himself might have the obligation to procure insurance.
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3-415 which would protect the visible surety. If only very unreasonable
(and hence highly prejudicial) conduct triggers the defense, perhaps it
is unfair to impose this risk on the surety who has, after all, tried to
protect himself by giving warning of his existence. But this argument
is persuasive only if major impairment of collateral is easily discover-
able by a potential purchaser of negotiable paper and readily distin-
guishable from what courts would consider minor and permissible
infractions. It is the costs of such an inquiry, as well as the judicial risk
of misassessment of that which it unearths, against which the holder in
due course can legitimately claim immunity.
The strongest case that can be made for a literal reading of Section
3-415 rests on somewhat different, though related, premises. If it be-
comes well-understood that general suretyship defenses can be raised
once suretyship is known, prospective purchasers are likely not to in-
vest in such negotiable paper without inquiring of the surety whether,
perchance, he has some defenses. If the surety should reply that he
does not or if, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, he
does not reply at all, presumably he would be estopped from raising
the defense at a later date. If, however, the surety is careful to indicate
only that he does not presently know of any defenses which he might
have, such an estoppel will not lie. But in that event principles of good
faith and fair dealing might impose a duty of further investigation on
one side or the other, depending upon facts not subject to generaliza-
tion. The widow-surety and the corporate-officer-surety would pre-
dictably be treated differently. In other words, the literal reading of
Section 3-415 can be defended as a policy decision to avoid, as unneces-
sarily arbitrary, legislative rule-making in residual situations for which
no particular factual model is dearly discernible.
In the final analysis, the choice between the variant interpretations
of Section 3-415 rests on an evaluation of the importance on the one
hand of reasonably predictable commercial rules, and on the other of
judicial flexibility in administering the variety of relationships which
result in accommodation status. How the first court to cope with this
problem resolves the conflict of values remains to be seen; it will un-
doubtedly be influenced as much by the factual patterns before it as
by the guidance it has gotten from the Code.
IV. Conclusion
The Code's treatment of the negotiable suretyship obligation in
Article 3 is a puzzling one. While it is clear that the governing provi-
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sions were meant to provide the surety with greater safeguards than
he had enjoyed under pre-existing law, the extent of the Code's bene-
ficence is difficult to ascertain. The surety's expectations are most likely
to be protected when he is competing with a holder not in due course,
but even then he may be limited by the precise terms of his commit-
ment on the instrument. When the surety is faced by a holder in due
course, surely a likely adversary on negotiable paper, countervailing
policies of unclogged negotiability and inquiry-free transfer make his
position highly precarious.
What is curious about Article Ts response to these inevitable con-
flicts is not its unwillingness to award full priority to the tender
sensibilities of the surety, but rather its reluctance to demarcate where
suretyship principles should be subordinated to other important com-
mercial considerations. The draftsmen's unmistakable intention to
strengthen the institution of suretyship, deriving no doubt at least in
part from a felt need to preserve alternatives to the Article 9 security
device, is considerably diluted in effect by the Article's failure to spell
out operative guidelines for determining the liability of the potential
surety.
The Code's failure to deal comprehensively with this problem can-
not be explained by a dearth of data or case law. This is not a newly
developing field of practice, such as subordination clauses, to which
draftsmen should respond at best in gingerly or open-ended fashion.'"
The resolution of conflicts between sureties and creditors and their
successors in interest has been familiar ground for litigation for
decades.'-7
Nor can it be argued that the Code's draftsmen were oblivious to the
commercial importance of providing factual criteria which would
allow the contracting parties to predict accurately the scope of their
rights and duties without the constant threat of litigation. On the
contrary, one of the Code's most salient and most convincing selling
points during the enactment process was precisely that it would not
only modernize but also make more certain the governing principles
for commercial law. Legal consequences are to be stated, according to
one of the early comments, so as to avoid "making practical issues be-
tween practical men turn upon the location of an intangible some-
thing."'74 "The scheme of the Article [Article 9, in fact, but presuma-
172. See Gilmore, Article 9: What It Does Not Do For the Future, 26 LA. L. RE.
300 (1966).
173. See, e.g., sources dted note 157 supra.
174. Section 2-101, Comment.
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bly the rest of the Code as well] is to make distinctions, where
distinctions are necessary, along functional rather than formal lines."l17
Yet the inconclusive resolution of the competing claims of suretyship
and negotiability law has its counterpart in other sections of the Code.
For example, the position of the seller who, under Article 2, has re-
sidual property rights in potential conflict with the interests of pur-
chasers and creditors depends upon time-honored, open-ended criteria
such as good faith, voidable title, and lawful possession.17 0 Only where
such a seller entrusts his goods to a merchant is his priority position
clear-and fatal, in most instances. 177 The parallel situation in the sure-
tyship case is the contest between latent surety and innocent holder in
due course.
The analogy between the Article 2 quasi-secured seller and the Arti-
cle 3 accommodation party is an instructive one because in both in-
stances the Code's vagueness reflects an absence of sound factual models
upon which to build. The beauty of the common law notion of voidable
title was that it could be stretched or contracted to fit a large variety of
deceptive deals, depending upon the relative equities of the particular
case.118 Where, out of this mass of potential situations, some recurrent
factual patterns such as cash sale, or bouncing checks, or mistaken
identity can be identified, the Code removes them from the operative
range of the voidable title construct. 79 It is only the unstructured resi-
due which is left open-ended. The problem with the law of negotiable
suretyship is that it is all unstructured residue.
It is inherent in the skeletonic nature of the negotiable instrument
that it can be used for a wide variety of business deals. Superimpose
upon this the fact that a surety may be a generous friend, a gullible
relative, a corporate director, or a merchant discounting receivables.
Consider further that subsequent takers may be either sophisticated
commercial credit institutions or sporadic purchasers of investment
paper. No fixed set of rules could operate justly in all the unpredict-
able situations which can arise.
Against this background, the draftsmen's decision to lay down non-
rules, or semi-rules, is understandable and defensible, once the judg-
ment to codify at all has been made. And it is now too late to question
175. Section 9-101, Comment.
176. Section 2-403(l).
177. Section 2.403(2).
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the wisdom of so broad a codification as the Uniform Commercial Code
presents-despite recurrent feelings of unease about the real-world
counterpart to Karl Llewellyn's great vision. If it is occasionally neces-
sary to over-codify some few parts of the law without adequate factual
referents in order to preserve the continuity and coverage of the Code
as a whole, that may simply be the price to be paid for comprehensive
law-making and legislative reform. Still, that price could and should be
minimized by indicating with greater clarity than the Code now does
when and where issues have deliberately been left open for continued
case law development.
What emerges, then, as the principal weakness of the Code's Article
3 sections dealing with suretyship obligations is not so much the ab-
sence of definitive solutions but the failure to establish any consistent
pattern of legislative intervention. At some points, the sections dictate
with fanatical and misguided precision what the suretyship obligation
may or may not contain. At other junctures, the sections contain en-
tirely unguided references to large bodies of perhaps inapplicable local
law. Only rarely does the Code specify for the parties and the courts
those degrees of freedom which the Code decided, correctly, to preserve.
The choice of a suretyship form of security will continue, under
Article 3, to be a much less formal, a much less structured, a much less
confining contractual device than even the free-swinging security inter-
est under Article 9. Only the parties themselves can properly balance
the virtue of these freedoms against the concomitant risks of uncer-
tainty which the suretyship arrangement entails.
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